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HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE
DOUBLE TAXATION
HerwigJ Schlunk*
INTRODUCTION

In the current U.S. federal income tax regime, some of the income generated by economic activity conducted in corporate form is
taxed twice: first when it is earned by the corporation and again when
it is distributed to the owner of an interest in such corporation. This
"double taxation" has long been the subject of scorn, and numerous
proposals have been put forward to end it.' Most recently, President
George W. Bush loudly joined the chorus of double taxation's detractors. He proclaimed that such taxation is "unfair" and "doesn't make
any sense," and proposed legislation-centered on an exclusion of
dividends from individual income taxation-that would have been its
2
death knell.
I have no particular quarrel with the President's assessment of
double taxation as such taxation is currently practiced in the United
States. That is, when the effect of double taxation either is, or in any
event is perceived to be, to incrementally burden capital (narrowly
* Associate Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. I want to thank Reuven
Avi-Yonah, Paul Edelman, Julie Roin, and David Weisbach for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. I also want to thank Alvin Warren for giving me the
opportunity to present a draft of this Article at the Harvard Law School Workshop on
Current Research in Taxation.

1 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND CORPORATE TAx SYSTEMs: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992); Michael J.
Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Integrationof Corporateand IndividualIncome Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAx NoTEs 1767 (1999).
2 Remarks Following a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange with Reporters, 39
WEEKLY COMP. PRs. Doc. 30, 32 (Jan. 6, 2003), availableat http://www.gpoccess.gov/
wcomp/v39no2.html. The day after President Bush's remarks, two bills were introduced in the House that proposed the exclusion of dividends. See H.R. 178, 108th
Cong. (2003); H.R. 49, 108th Cong. (2003). Congress did not enact the President's
dividend exclusion, but rather, a temporary reduction in the rate of tax imposed on
dividend income. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.

108-27, § 301, 117 Stat. 752, 758 (2003).
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defined to exclude human capital) or, more correctly, to incrementally burden corporate equity capital-for no better reason than
that corporate equity capital is corporate equity capital-such double
taxation can well be viewed as being unfair because it discriminates
against corporate equity capital for no particularly defensible reason.
Moreover, such double taxation can well be viewed as senseless because a whole host of financial arrangements can readily be substituted for much or even most corporate equity capital.
But the mere fact that double taxation as it is currently practiced
in the United States may be unfair and senseless is not an indictment
of double taxation in general. That is, there is nothing inherent in
the concept of double taxation that necessarily leads to the imposition
of an incremental tax burden solely on some nonhuman capital.
Once this is understood, it turns out that there is nothing wrong with,
and much right with, certain types of double taxation. 3 In fact, as I
will demonstrate below, circumstances can and do arise in which it is
not the presence, but rather the absence, of double taxation that is
unfair and senseless! Given that these circumstances invariably exist
in the "real world," it follows that the President's energies would be
better spent trying to reform the United States' double tax regime,
rather than trying to dismantle it.
This Article is divided into three Parts. The first Part is devoted
to an example demonstrating that, while double taxation may be gratuitous in a purely domestic context, it invariably becomes necessary
in a multinational context. The second Part formalizes and generalizes the example, and concludes that double taxation is not only necessary in a multinational context, but also in any multi-period
domestic context. The third Part contains a few policy prescriptions
that, I fervently hope, will guide future administrations.
I.
A.

AN EXAMPLE

Integrated Domestic Taxation

Consider a country called LowTax that is inhabited by an even
number of identical individuals. All such individuals face an identical
business opportunity. The opportunity requires an initial capital outlay of 1500,4 which can be financed at a 10% interest rate, and which
3

See Herwig Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the CorporateTax, But to Save It, 56 TAX

L. REx,. 329 (2003) (discussing some defensible reasons for imposing an incremental

"corporate" income tax, and illustrating how to design a "corporate" income tax regime based on one of them).
4

Figures represent monetary units.
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is used as follows: 1000 to build a factory, and 500 to build a road to
the factory. Once these investments have been made, the opportunity
requires the capital and labor of two individuals, as well as an annual
expenditure of 250 for the purchase of raw materials and an annual
expenditure of 20 for the purchase of security services. From these
various inputs an output is manufactured that, when sold, generates
annual gross receipts of 600.
If two individuals form ajoint venture to pursue this business opportunity, their joint venture will generate an aggregate annual return-"net income"-of 180. Consequently, each joint venturer's
share of such return-that is, the "net income" generated by the capital and labor she devotes to the joint venture's business activity-will
be 90. If, as I further posit, each joint venturer invariably annually
spends 10 on personal security services (alarm systems and the like),
and 20 on automobile maintenance services (necessitated by driving
on poorly maintained dirt roads), her "ultimately disposable income"-that is, the annual income that she has available for the
purchase of consumption goods and services other than security ser5
vices and automobile maintenance services-will be 60.
TABLE

1.1. LowTAx

ENTIRE VENTURE
Gross Receipts
Interest Expense (Factory)
Interest Expense (Road)
Raw Materials

JOINT VENTURE OPPORTUNITY
With No

With

With

Government

Government

Benefits

Benefits

Benefits

and Taxes

600
-100
-50
-250

600
-100
-50
-250

600
-100
-50
-250

Security Services

-20

0

0

Annual Return or "Net Income"

180

200

200

90

100

100

EACH PARTICIPANT
Share of "Net Business Income"

Security Services

-10

Automobile Maintenance Services
Individual Income Tax

-20
0

-20
0

60

80

Ultimately Disposable Income

0

0
-20
-20
60

Suppose that LowTax decides to provide certain "benefits" to its
businesses and residents. Specifically, LowTax decides to provide police protection. Suppose that if LowTax provides such police protection, each joint venture will be able to forego its annual expenditure
on security services and, moreover, each resident will likewise be able
to forego her annual expenditure on security services. As illustrated
5

See infra Table 1.1, column 1.
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in column 2 of Table 1.1, LowTax's provision of police protection will
directly cause the joint venture's net income to iucrease to 200. In
addition, it will (partly indirectly and partly directly) cause each joint
venturer's ultimately disposable income to increase to 80.
Unfortunately, LowTax will generally incur a cost when it bestows
benefits on its businesses and residents. The amount of this cost will
depend on how efficiently LowTax can produce and deliver the benefits in question. I assume, for purposes of this example, that LowTax
can provide the benefits at exactly the same cost as the private sector.
Thus, LowTax incurs a cost of 20 when providing police protection to
ajoint venture, and a cost of 10 when providing police protection to a
joint venturer.
LowTax must find a way to cover these costs. In general, this
means that LowTax will need to impose a tax. Suppose that LowTax
chooses to impose an income tax. To balance its budget, LowTax
might impose a 20% tax on the "net business income" of each resident. This tax will generate 20 of revenue from each resident (20%
tax imposed on 100 of taxable income), and hence will provide
LowTax with exactly the amount of revenue it requires. As illustrated
in column 3 of Table 1.1, and following directly from the assumption
that LowTax provides benefits at exactly the same cost as the private
sector, the effect of the tax is to completely offset the windfall in ultimately disposable income that LowTax appeared to bestow upon its
residents. Thus, under these assumptions, 'there is no free lunch.
Consider now a neighboring country called HighTax that is, except with respect to its tax and benefits policy, in every way identical to
LowTax. HighTax has an even number of residents who are all faced
with a business. opportunity that is identical to the one facing
LowTax's residents. Thus, HighTax's residents will also pair up to
form joint ventures, each of which will require an initial capital outlay
of 1500, financed at a 10% interest rate, and used to build a factory
(1000) and a road to the factory (500), as well as the capital and labor
of its two joint venturers, raw materials costing 250 annually, and security services costing 20 annually. From these various inputs, the
joint venture will manufacture an output that, when sold, generates
annual gross receipts of 600.
Under these assumptions, each joint venture will generate an aggregate annual return of 180, which will provide each joint venturer
with an annual return-her "net business income"-of 90. If, as I further posit, each joint venturer invariably annually spends 10 on personal security services and 20 on automobile maintenance services,
her "ultimately disposable income"-that is, the income she has avail-
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able for the purchase of consumption goods and services other than
security services and automobile maintenance services-will be 60.6
TABLE

1.2.

HIGHTAX JOINT VENTURE OPPORTUNITY
With No
Government
Benefits

With
Government
Benefits

With
Benefits
and Taxes

600
-100
-50
-250
-20

600
-100
0
-250
0

600
-100
0
-250
0

180

250

250

90

125

125

0
0

0
0

ENTIRE VENTURE

Gross Receipts
Interest Expense (Factory)
Interest Expense (Road)
Raw Materials
Security Services
Annual Return or "Net Income"
EACH PARTICIPANT
Share of "Net Business Income"

Security Services
Automobile Maintenance Services
Individual Income Tax

Ultimately Disposable Income

-10
-20
0

0

60

125

-65

60

As did LowTax, HighTax decides to provide certain benefits to its
businesses and residents. However, it decides to provide more benefits than did LowTax. In addition to providing police protection,
HighTax decides to build and maintain roads. Suppose that the provision of police protection has exactly the same effects in HighTax as
it had in LowTax. Thus, each joint venture is able to forego its annual
expenditure on security services, and each joint venturer is likewise
able to forego her annual expenditure on security services. Suppose
that the provision of roads has the following effects: each joint venture
is able to forego the initial investment of 500 that was used to build a
road to its factory, and each resident is able to forego her annual expenditure on automobile maintenance services. Thus, as illustrated in
column 2 of Table 1.2, HighTax's provision of police protection and
road services will directly cause each joint venture's net income to increase to 250. In addition, it will (partly indirectly and partly directly)
cause each joint venturer's ultimately disposable income to increase to
125.
But, as did LowTax, HighTax will generally incur a cost when it
bestows benefits on its businesses and residents. I assume, as I did in
the case of LowTax, that HighTax can provide the benefits it chooses
to provide at exactly the same cost as the private sector. Thus,
HighTax incurs a cost of 20 when providing police protection to a
joint venture, a cost of 10 when providing police protection to ajoint
6

See infra Table 1.2, column 1.
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venturer, a cost of 50 when providing road services to a joint venture,
and a cost of 20 when providing road services to a joint venturer.
Of course, HighTax must find a way to cover these costs. It, too,
chooses to enact an income tax. To balance its budget, HighTax
might impose a 52% tax on the "net business income" of each resident. This tax will generate 65 of revenue from each resident (52%
tax imposed on 125 of taxable income), and hence will provide
HighTax with exactly the amount of revenue it requires. As illustrated
in column 3 of Table 1.2, and again following directly from the assumption that HighTax provides benefits at exactly the same cost as
the private sector, the effect of the tax is to completely offset the windfall in ultimately disposable income that HighTax appeared to bestow
upon its residents.
B.

Integrated Multinational Taxation

Suppose, now, that into this balkanized world come two additional individuals-J, who chooses to reside in LowTax, and K, who
chooses to reside in HighTax. Since neither J nor K can find a joint
venture partner in her country of residence (since all other individuals in each country are already paired up), Jand Kform the first crossborder joint venture.
Suppose first that J and K form the J-Kjoint venture in LowTax,
and that such joint venture conducts all of its business activity in
LowTax. In this case, in keeping with its policy of providing police
protection to its businesses, LowTax will provide police protection to
the J-Kjoint venture. This incremental provision of police protection
will impose a cost of 20 on LowTax. In addition, in keeping with its
policy of providing police protection to its residents, LowTax will provide police protection to J This incremental provision of police protection will impose a cost of 10 on LowTax. Finally, in keeping with its
policy of providing police protection and road services to its residents,
HighTax will provide both police protection and road services to K.
This incremental provision of police protection and road services will
impose a cost of 30 on HighTax. Thus, when all is said and done,
LowTax must, to balance its budget, raise additional tax revenue of
30, and HighTax must, to balance its budget, also raise additional tax
revenue of 30.
I assume that neither LowTax nor HighTax is willing to undertake a wholesale overhaul of its income tax system simply to raise the
additional revenue it requires. In particular, neither country is willing
to change the way in which it taxes any individual who is paired up in
a wholly domestic joint venture. Rather, each country seeks a way to
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integrate the taxation of Jand K, the two individuals not paired up in
a wholly domestic joint venture, into its existing tax system. More
mundanely, LowTax seeks a straightforward and more or less principled way to impose aggregate taxes of 30 on J and K, and HighTax
similarly seeks a straightforward and more or less principled way to
impose aggregate taxes of 30 on J and K
Note that there is no particularly principled reason for either
country to give Jany special tax treatment. From LowTax's vantage, J
is a LowTax resident who is involved in ajoint venture that is engaged
in business activity that is conducted entirely in LowTax. Thus, Jlooks
exactly like every other resident of LowTax, and should be taxed accordingly. If so, LowTax will tax J at its usual 20% rate on her net
business income of 100, and will thus collect 20 of tax revenue from
her. Similarly, from HighTax's vantage, Jis a LowTax resident who is
involved in a joint venture that is engaged in business activity conducted entirely in LowTax. Thus, Jlooks exactly like every other resident of LowTax, and should be taxed accordingly, namely not at all.
After taking the taxes imposed on Jinto account, it becomes necessary for LowTax and HighTax to find a way to collect taxes of 10 and
30, respectively, from K Note that the fact that both countries must
collect tax from Kis not, in and of itself, problematic. That is, Kis the
only person in the world who actually has sufficient contacts with both
countries to justify such dual taxation: Ks income is derived from business activity conducted in LowTax (and is, therefore, directly enhanced by the business benefits that LowTax provides); K is a resident
of HighTax (and her quality of life is therefore directly enhanced by
the non-business benefits that HighTax provides). What is problematic is finding a way to coordinate LowTax's and HighTax's tax regimes so that each country imposes on K a tax burden that exactly
covers the cost of the benefits provided to K
Since the J-K joint venture's business activity is conducted in
LowTax, LowTax has the first bite at the apple of Ks income. What
should LowTax do? Note that LowTax cannot tax K as a resident, not
because it is impractical to do so, but rather because doing so would
result in the collection of too much revenue. That is, tax revenue
collected from Kwould amount to 20 (a 20% tax imposed on 100 of
net business income), when only 10 is actually required. Thus,
LowTax must devise a mechanism that will impose a lesser tax burden
on K Two such mechanisms are frequently employed in the "real
world." The first mechanism involves imposing tax at a reduced "nonresident" tax rate. Thus, LowTax could balance its budget by imposing a 10% nonresident tax rate on all of Ks net business income (a
10% tax imposed on 100 of income yields 10 of tax). The second
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mechanism involves imposing the usual "resident" tax rate, but on a
reduced tax base. Thus, LowTax could balance its budget by imposing its usual 20% tax rate, but only on 50% of Ks net business income
7
(a 20% tax imposed on 50 of income yields 10 of tax).
TABLE

2.1. TAx COLLECTIONS FROM K

Necessary Revenue from K
LowTax Taxes K at 10% rate
HighTax Ignores LowTax Taxes
HighTax Allows Deduction for Taxes
HighTax Allows Foreign Tax Credit
HighTax Excludes Foreign Income
LowTax Taxes K on 50% of Income
HighTax Taxes K on 50% of Income

LowTax

HighTax

10
10
10
-

30
52
46.8
42
0
26

Suppose, first, that LowTax decides to impose a 10% tax on all of
Ks net business income. In the "real world," HighTax typically responds in one of four ways. At one extreme, HighTax can ignore
LowTax's imposition of tax and simply tax Kas it taxes any other resident, that is, at its full 52% tax rate on Ks entire 100 of worldwide net
business income (computed without allowing any deduction for
LowTax tax payments or accruals).8 Such an imposition of tax would,
however, raise 52 of revenue, which is 22 more than HighTax requires. At the other extreme, HighTax could allow K to exclude her
LowTax source income from HighTax taxation. 9 In that case, however, HighTax would raise no revenue at all, and thus would face a
revenue shortfall of 30.10
7

The first mechanism is adopted in most tax treaties. See, e.g., MODEL TAX CON10-12 (1992) (recommending that the source
country impose tax at reduced rates of 5% to 15% on dividends paid to nonresidents,
10% on interest paid to nonresidents, and 0% on royalties paid to nonresidents).
The second mechanism is adopted by most states for the purpose of taxing the income of multistate enterprises. JEROME HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATION 653-54 (5th ed. 1988); see also infra Table 2.1.
8 This extreme requires a truly unusual confluence of improbables. Thus, if K
were a U.S. resident, it would require that: (1) the United States has no tax treaty with
LowTax; (2) the United States allows no deduction for taxes paid to LowTax (e.g., the
Internal Revenue Code might be called off because the payments are illegal under
U.S. law); and (3) the United States allows no foreign tax credit for the taxes paid to
LowTax (e.g., because the Internal Revenue Code does not treat the payments as
"income" taxes).
9 See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 911 (2000) (allowing U.S. residents to exclude from U.S. income taxation certain amounts of "foreign earned income").
10 See supraTable 2.1.
VENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL §§
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In between these extremes are the two most typical responses.
First, HighTax could tax Kas it taxes any other resident, but allow Ka
deduction for the taxes K is required to pay to LowTax. I I Thus, K
would be taxed at HighTax's 52% rate, but only on 90 of net income
(100 of worldwide net business income reduced by 10 of tax required
to be paid to LowTax). If HighTax adopts this response, it would
raise revenue of 46.8, which exceeds its requirements by 16.8.12 Alternatively, HighTax could tax K as it taxes any other resident, but allow
K a foreign tax credit for the foreign taxes that K is required to pay
with respect to her foreign source income.1 3 In the instant case, K
would be taxed at HighTax's 52% tax rate on 100 of worldwide net
business income, and, thus, would incur a tentative tax liability of 52.
However, K would be entitled to reduce this tentative tax liability by
the amount of foreign taxes that she is required to pay to LowTax,
namely 10. Thus, K would ultimately pay 42 of taxes to HighTax.
Again, HighTax's tax collections would exceed its revenue requirements, this time by 12.14
Finally, suppose that LowTax adopts the alternative mechanism
that provides it with the correct amount of revenue: it taxes K at its
full 20% tax rate, but only on that fraction of Ks net business income-in this case, 50%-that it deems to be earned in LowTax. 15 In
such case, HighTax might, as an alternative to the four foregoing
mechanisms, adopt its own income allocation scheme. Assuming that
it does, and assuming that the two income allocation schemes are
identical, so that both LowTax and HighTax agree that 50% of Ks net
business income should be allocated to LowTax and that 50% of Ks
net business income should be allocated to HighTax, HighTax would
impose its 52% tax on 50% of Ks net business income. Thus,
HighTax would collect tax revenue of 26 (a 52% tax imposed on 50%
of Ks 100 of worldwide net business income). Unfortunately, just like
all the other alternatives, this strategy is imperfect: it leaves HighTax
with a revenue shortfall of 4.16
11
12

See I.R.C. § 164(a)(3).
See supra Table 2.1.

13

See I.R.C. § 901.

14 See supra Table 2.1.
15 In general, states allocate income earned by a multistate enterprise to one state
or another on the basis of a formula (differing from state to state) that takes into
account the enterprise's sales, payroll, and property in the various states. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 63-3027 (Michie 2000); Mo. REv. STAT. § 32.200 (2001). In the example, I do not base my 50% allocation on any such formula, but simply on fiat: it is the
allocation necessary to balance LowTax's budget.
16 See supra Table 2.1.
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Not surprisingly, similar difficulties are encountered if the J-K
joint venture is formed in HighTax, and conducts all of its business
activity in HighTax. In such case, in keeping with its policy of providing police protection and road services to its businesses and residents,
HighTax will provide police protection costing 20 and road services
costing 50 to the J-Kjoint venture and police protection costing 10
and road services costing 20 to K Thus, HighTax incurs 100 of incremental expenditures. In addition, in keeping with its policy of providing police protection to its residents, LowTax will provide police
protection costing 10 to J Taking these costs into account, HighTax
must impose additional taxes of 100 to balance its budget, and
LowTax must impose additional taxes of 10 to balance its budget.
Assuming again that neither country is willing to undertake a
wholesale overhaul of its existing tax system, the question each faces is
how to integrate J and K into its tax system. In particular, HighTax
needs such integration to be accomplished in a way that raises 100 of
revenue, and LowTax needs such integration to be accomplished in a
way that raises 10 of revenue.
The taxation of K should be straightforward. HighTax has no
good reason to tax K differently than it taxes any other resident involved in ajoint venture that is engaged in business activity conducted
entirely within HighTax. Thus, HighTax should tax K at a 52% rate
on her 125 of net business income and, hence, should raise 65 of revenue from K Similarly, LowTax has no good reason to tax K differently than it taxes any other nonresident lacking LowTax source
income, namely not at all.
After taking the foregoing taxes imposed on K into account,
HighTax and LowTax must find a way to impose taxes of exactly 35
and 10, respectively, on J Again, there can be no question that both
HighTax and LowTax are entitled to tax J's income: HighTax's entitlement stems from the fact that J's income is derived from business
activity conducted in HighTax; LowTax's entitlement stems from the
fact that J is a LowTax resident. Rather, the question is whether
HighTax and LowTax can coordinate their tax regimes so as to collect
exactly the right amount of tax.
I begin by considering HighTax's strategy, since HighTax has the
first bite at the apple of J's income. Obviously, HighTax cannot tax J
as if she were a resident, since doing so would result in too much
revenue: revenue would total 65 (a 52% tax imposed on 125 of net
business income), when only 35 is required. Thus, HighTax must resort to a mechanism that will impose a lesser tax burden on J As
already noted, the two most prevalent mechanisms are to impose tax
on J at a reduced "nonresident" tax rate, and to impose tax on J at
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HighTax's full 52% tax rate, but only on a fraction of J's net business
income. If HighTax adopts the former mechanism, its nonresident
tax rate would need to be 28%, since a 28% tax imposed on J's 125 of
net business income would yield 35 of tax revenue. If HighTax adopts
the latter mechanism, it would need to impose its 52% tax rate on
54% of f's net business income, since a 52% tax imposed on 54% of
17
125 of net business income would yield 35 of tax revenue.
TABLE

2.2.

TAX COLLECTIONS FROM J

Necessary Revenue from J
HighTax Taxes J at 28% Rate
LowTax Ignores HighTax Taxes
LowTax Allows Deduction for Taxes
LowTax Allows Foreign Tax Credit
LowTax Excludes Foreign Income
HighTax Taxes Jon 54% of Income
LowTax Taxes Jon 46% of Income

LowTax

HighTax

10
25
18
0
0
11.5

35
35
35
-

Suppose, first, that HighTax adopts the strategy of taxing J at a
28% reduced nonresident tax rate. As already noted, LowTax has
four more or less standard responses. First, at one extreme, it could
ignore HighTax taxes and simply tax Jon all 125 of her worldwide net
business income. However, applying LowTax's 20% tax rate to J's 125
of income would result in tax collections of 25. Such tax collections
would exceed LowTax's revenue requirements by 15. Second, at the
other extreme, LowTax could exclude J's income from LowTax taxation on the basis that the income is not LowTax source income. But
that strategy would result in no tax collections from j, and so would
leave LowTax with a revenue shortfall of 10.18
Third, in between these extremes, LowTax could tax J as it taxes
any other resident, but allow Ja deduction for the taxes J is required
to pay to HighTax. Thus, J would be taxed at LowTax's 20% tax rate
on 90 of income (125 of worldwide net business income reduced by
35 of tax required to be paid to HighTax). If LowTax adopts this
strategy, it raises revenue of 18, and accordingly has a surplus of 8.
Finally, LowTax could tax f as it taxes any other resident, but allow Ja
foreign tax credit for the taxes Jis required to pay to HighTax. In this
case, J would be taxed at LowTax's 20% tax rate on all 125 of her
worldwide net business income, and so would incur a tentative tax
liability of 25. However, J would be entitled to reduce this tentative
17
18

See infra Table 2.2.
See supra Table 2.2.
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tax liability by the amount of foreign taxes she is required to pay to
HighTax. In practice, Jwould generally not be entitled to reduce her
tentative tax liability by all of the taxes she is required to pay to
HighTax, since a reduction of 35 applied to a liability of 25 would
produce a negative tax payment, that is, a tax refund. So LowTax
would generally limit f's tax credit to the amount of tax that LowTax
would normally impose on f's foreign source income. 19 In the instant
case, J has 125 of HighTax source income, so her foreign tax credit
would-be limited to 25 (LowTax's 20% tax rate imposed on 125 of
income results in 25 of tax). But this credit would still be sufficient to
wipe out J's entire LowTax tax liability. Thus, when all is said and
done, LowTax would collect no tax from J, and thus would face a revenue shortfall of 10.20

Now, suppose that HighTax adopts the alternative mechanism
that provides it with the necessary amount of revenue: it taxes jat its
full 52% tax rate but only on that fraction of J's net business income-in this case, 54%-that it deems to have been earned in
HighTax. In such case, LowTax might also adopt an income allocation scheme. Assuming that it does, and assuming that the two allocation schemes are identical, so that both HighTax and LowTax agree
that 54% of J's net business income should be allocated to HighTax
and 46% of f's net business income should be allocated to LowTax,
LowTax would impose a 20% tax on 46% of J's net business income.
Thus, LowTax would collect tax revenue of 11.5 (a 20% tax imposed
on 46% of J's 125 of worldwide net business income). Again, the desired result proves elusive; LowTax would achieve a revenue windfall
of 1.5.21
C. Double Taxation to the Rescue
Why is it that LowTax and HighTax find it impossible to implement tax regimes that collect all of the necessary revenue, but only the
necessary revenue? The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is that both
LowTax and HighTax have what are called integrated income tax regimes! Such regimes, by their very nature, conflate the taxes imposed
on business activity with the taxes imposed on consumption activity.
Thus, a country with an integrated income tax regime cannot directly
impose on businesses a tax that exactly corresponds to the cost of government benefits that such country provides to businesses. And it cannot directly impose on individuals a tax that exactly corresponds to
19
20
21

See I.R.C. § 904.
See supra Table 2.2.
Id.
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the cost of government benefits that such country provides to individuals in their non-business capacities.
This defect, while present in the purely domestic context, does
not, under my current assumptions, take on a huge amount of importance there. Thus, if, as is trivially true in my example, the business
benefits (indirectly) provided to each individual increase as her
amount of net business income increases, and if the non-business benefits provided to each individual increase as her amount of "individual
income"-defined as the excess of her net business income over her
share of the cost of governmentally provided business benefits-increases, then an "integrated" income tax can be designed that, when
imposed on each individual's taxable income-defined as her net business income-will yield tax revenue exactly equal to the cost of the
business and the non-business benefits provided to such individual.
In the multinational context, however, the ability to successfully
employ such an integrated income tax regime vanishes. That is, an
individual with multinational contacts will continue to (indirectly) receive business benefits that increase as her amount of net business
income increases, and she will continue to receive non-business benefits that increase as her amount of "individual income"-still defined
as the excess of her net business income over her share of the cost of
governmentally provided business benefits-increases. But she will receive the business benefits and the non-business benefits from different countries. Thus, neither country can simply impose its integrated
income tax on her taxable income, still defined as her net business
income. Rather, the country providing the business benefits must impose a tax designed solely to cover the cost of its business benefits. And the

country providing the non-business benefits must impose a tax designed solely to cover the cost of its non-business benefits. Gladly, there is a

straightforward way for each country to do this. Each country must
impose a tax on each individual's net business income that reflects the
cost of the business benefits it (indirectly) provides to such individual,
And each country must impose a tax on each individual's individual
income-as ever defined as the excess of her net business income
over her share of the cost of governmentally provided business benefits-that reflects the cost of the non-business benefits it provides to
such individual. Of course, following such a strategy amounts to enacting a double tax regime.
To illustrate, I return to the dilemma faced by LowTax and
HighTax in the face of the J-Kjoint venture. Suppose that LowTax
replaces its integrated income tax regime, which imposes a 20% tax
on each individual's net business income, with a double tax regime
that imposes a 10% "corporate" income tax on each individual's net
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business income (collected, for the sake of administrative convenience, from the business) and an 11% "individual" income tax on
each individual's "individual income," defined as her net business income less her share of the corporate income tax: And suppose that
HighTax replaces its integrated income tax regime, which imposes a
52% tax on each individual's net business income, with a double tax
regime that imposes a 28% "corporate" income tax on each individual's net business income (collected, for the sake of administrative
convenience, from the business) and a 33% "individual" income tax
on each individual's "individual income," defined as her net business
income less her share of the corporate income tax. As illustrated in
Table 3.1, in the purely domestic context, the double tax regimes perfectly replicate the prior integrated income tax regimes.
TABLE

3.1.

TAXATION OF JOINT VENTURE UNDER A

CLAssicAL TAX

REGIME

Jv

Jv

Conducted
in LowTax

Conducted
in HighTax

600
-100
-50
-250

600
-100
0
-250

200.

250

ENTIRE VENTURE

Gross Receipts
Interest Expense (Factory)
Interest Expense (Road)
Raw Materials

NetIncome ofJoint Venture

-

,

"Corporate" Income Tax

-20-7

After-Tax Business Income

180

180

.9.0_

_90.

EACH PARTICIPANT
"IndividualIncome"

__

"Individual" Income Tax
Automobile Maintenance Services
Ultimately Disposable Income

-10
-20
60

..

-30
0
60

But, of course, the double tax regimes actually do much more
than merely replicate the results of the prior integrated income tax
regimes. In the multinational context, i.e., in the case of the J-K
cross-border joint venture, it is now easily possible for each country to
collect exactly the right amount of tax. To do so it must simply adhere to the following obvious set of "international tax" rules:
(1) Each country must impose its "corporate" income tax on all
of the net business income generated by a business conducted within
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such country's borders, whether or not the owners of such business
22
reside in such country;
(2) Each country must exempt from its "corporate" income tax
all of the net business income generated by a business conducted
outside of such country's borders, even if the owners of the business
23
reside in such country;
(3) Each country must impose its "individual" income tax on all
of the after-corporate-tax net business income received by its residents, whether or not such income is received from a business conducted within such country's borders; 24 and
(4) Each country must exempt from its "individual" income tax
all of the after-corporate-tax net business income received by its nonresidents, even if such income is received from a business conducted
within such country's borders.
As illustrated in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, an application of these rules
indeed produces the required tax collections for LowTax and
HighTax.

22 Similar rules have been proposed elsewhere. See, e.g., Julie Roin, Competition
and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 591
(2001) (arguing that foreign corporations doing business in the United States should
be subjected to U.S. corporate income taxation, but perhaps at a reduced rate-reflecting her belief that, contrary to the assumption underlying my example, the revenues collected by the U.S. corporate income tax greatly exceed the cost of
governmentally provided business benefits).
23 Id. at 588. Roin would likewise exempt foreign source income from U.S. corporate income taxation. Id. In addition, Roin would impose a reduced rate of individual
income tax on the foreign source non-dividend business income of individuals. Id. at
593. Since such income is, under the current U.S. tax regime, only taxed in the hands
of individuals, the cost of any business benefits associated with the generation of this
income is currently collected directly from individuals. Obviously, such income, when
foreign-sourced, cannot have been enhanced by any domestically provided business
benefits. Thus, imposing a reduced individual income tax burden on such income
reflects the same notion motivating my rule: namely, that a charge for business benefits should only be collected by the country providing the business benefits.
24 Id. at 592. Roin would likewise impose the individual income tax on an individual's share of after-corporate-tax foreign corporate income. See id. at 592.
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LowTax

HighTax

2025
1026
0

0
0
3027

3.3. TAX COLLECTIONS FROM HIGHTAX JOINT VENTURE

Corporate Income Tax
Individual Income Tax Paid by J

LowTax
0
1029

Individual Income Tax Paid by K

0

II.
A.

[VOL- 79:1i

3.2. TAX COLLECTIONS FROM LowTAx JOINT VENTURE

Corporate Income Tax
Individual Income Tax Paid by J
Individual Income Tax Paid by K

TABLE

DAME

HighTax
7028
0
3030

GENERALIZING THE EXAMPLE

On the Relationship Between Income Taxes and Benefits Taxes

It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in an extended
philosophical discussion of the purposes of taxation. Suffice it to say
that a sovereign imposes taxes to collect revenue, and it collects revenue to enable it to purchase various goods and services. Perhaps not
in the short run, but certainly in the long run, all monies collected are
spent: what comes in goes out again. Moreover, what a sovereign
spends is not in general spent for its own "personal" benefit. In that
part of the modern world that concerns me in this Article, sovereigns
are not individuals indulging extravagant tastes in lavish palaces.
Rather, sovereigns are somewhat amorphous entities-that is, governments-and like other entities, are incapable of personal consumption in their own right. Thus, what a sovereign spends it spends on
others. Or, to fit the terminology in the heading to this section, the
goods and services purchased by a sovereign are purchased for the benefit of others. If the sovereign is benevolent, and I take it as a given that
all of the relevant sovereigns would, if they were sentient, view them25 Ten percent corporate income tax imposed on 200 of net business income.
26 Eleven percent individual income tax imposed on 90 of after-corporate-tax net
business income.
27 Thirty-three percent individual income tax imposed on 90 of after-corporatetax net business income.
28 Twenty-eight percent corporate income tax imposed on 250 of net business
income.
29 Eleven percent individual income tax imposed on 90 of after-corporate-tax net
business income.
30 Thirty-three percent individual income tax imposed on 90 of after-corporatetax net business income.
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selves as benevolent, the "others" that it intends to benefit are broadly
all of those persons that are its subjects. But a sovereign's subjects are
neither more nor less than the persons within its taxing jurisdiction.
Thus, the persons benefited by the sovereign's purchase of goods and
services are those who either pay taxes or could be made to pay
taxes. 31 But thatjust means that any tax imposed by a benevolent sovereign, including an income tax, is, at least when viewed in the aggregate, a benefits tax. The revenue it generates is entirely used to
purchase goods and services that provide benefits to those persons
who pay or could be made to pay the tax; the tax itself would not be
imposed but for a desire to provide such benefits.
What applies in the aggregate may or may not apply on the level
of any one subject. 32 Thus, it is generally neither meaningful nor cor-

rect to say that the taxes a sovereign collects from any one subject are
used, dollar-for-dollar or yen-for-yen, to purchase goods and services
that (directly? exclusively?) provide benefits to such subject. Of
course, some part of the taxes may be so used. Thus, even more
crassly than in the example in Part I, the sovereign might use part of
the taxes it collects from one of its subjects to pay the salary of a policeman who will be posted at such subject's door. However, most of
the goods and services purchased by the sovereign will provide benefits that are not and indeed cannot be targeted in such a narrow way.
Rather, such goods and services are so-called public goods and services: goods and services that benefit most or even all of the sovereign's subjects. These include not just police protection and adequate
roads, as in the example in Part I, but also an educational system, a
legal system, a social safety net, a national defense, and so on.
The tax problem that confronts the sovereign is how to allocate
the cost of such goods and services, or equivalently, the payment for
the benefits such goods and services provide, among its subjects. At
least three "reasonable" possibilities exist. First, the sovereign could
allocate the cost in that manner that it believes will induce its subjects
to maximize their aggregate output of goods and services. That is, it
could attempt to impose a tax that is "efficient." Second, the sover31

Note that, under my view, development grants made to foreign countries are

not made for the altruistic purpose of simply benefiting such countries, but rather for
the selfish purpose of benefiting the sovereign's own subjects, perhaps stimulating
commerce, perhaps by promoting global stability, etc.
32 See PETER ANDREW HARRIS, CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXATION AND
ALLOCATING TAXING RIGHTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES 13 (1996) (discussing some of the

difficulties of viewing an income tax as a benefit tax). In spite of these difficulties,
Harris ultimately concludes that something very much like a benefits view is not only
justifiable, but actually necessary, in multinational contexts. See id. at 445-56.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 79:1

eign could allocate the cost in that manner that it believes will maximize the utility of its subjects as measured by some social utility
function. That is, it could attempt to impose a tax based primarily on
considerations of welfare. Third, the sovereign could allocate the cost
in that manner that it believes best reflects how its subjects would demand and consume the goods and services it purchases and provides,
if it did not otherwise provide them. That is, it could attempt to impose a tax that treats such goods and services as either productive inputs or consumer goods and services, as the case may be, and that
treats its subjects as persons who must purchase such goods and services in order to enjoy their benefits. I will assume that the sovereign
follows the third approach. Accordingly:
Proposition 1: A sovereign can reasonably attempt to impose a tax that
reflects its assessment of its subjects' demand for and consumption of the goods and services it provides.
How can the sovereign measure any given subject's demand for
and consumption of the goods and services it provides? One way is to
try to assess the marginal cost "imposed by" the subject on the sovereign. That is, the sovereign could (theoretically) determine the cost
of the goods and services it would provide, based on the relevant political process, to all of its subjects other than the given subject in a
world without the given subject. And it could determine the cost of
the goods and services it actually provides. The excess of the latter
over the former is the marginal cost "imposed by" the given subject on
the sovereign. Of course, this excess is likely to be very small: the sovereign will rarely feel compelled by the addition of any given subject
to dramatically increase the amount of goods and services it provides.
Nonetheless, the excess is unlikely to be zero. That is, population
growth will almost invariably lead a sovereign to increase the aggregate amount of goods and services it provides. Thus, although not
necessarily measurable, population growth of even one subject will at
least statistically lead to an increase (albeit a very small one) in the
aggregate amount of goods and services the sovereign provides.
I believe that more can be said. I maintain that, in general, the
marginal cost imposed by any subject on the sovereign, at least on
average, will be greater the greater is such subject's wealth. For example, it surely costs the sovereign more to provide police protection to
Bill Gates than to me: he has a mansion and numerous other properties to protect; I have but a single modest house. And it surely costs
the sovereign more to provide adequate roads to Bill Gates than to
me: his business sends fleets of trucks onto the roads, transporting his
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software to various retail outlets; I merely drive one automobile back
and forth to my place of employment. And it surely costs the sovereign more to provide a legal system to Bill Gates than to me: he is
continuously involved in litigation; I am not currently involved in any.
Moreover, it arguably costs the sovereign more to provide an educational system to Bill Gates than to me: he demands a large educated
workforce and a large educated customer base; I simply demand a few
educated colleagues. And it arguably costs the sovereign more to provide a social safety net to Bill Gates than to me: he demands employees who will forego the incremental wages that would be necessary but
for the fallback of such a safety net; I am content to sleep better at
night in the knowledge that a safety net exists for me and my family.
And it arguably costs the sovereign more to provide national defense
to Bill Gates than to me: his manufacturing facilities might well be a
target for terrorists or other hostile persons; my house almost surely is
not.
Of course, and unfortunately, it would not be particularly practical for a sovereign to impose a tax on every subject in the amount of
the marginal cost imposed by such subject on the sovereign. The reason is that the aggregate of such marginal costs across all of the sovereign's subjects would be far less than the actual cost of the goods and
services the sovereign provides. Thus, a marginal cost analysis really
provides nothing more than a clean lower bound for the amount of
taxes that should be imposed on any given subject. Accordingly:
Proposition 2: The lower bound of the tax a sovereign should impose
on any subject, to reflect such subject's demand for and consumption of the goods and services the sovereign provides, increases (on average) as the subject's wealth increases.
A second way for the sovereign to measure any given subject's
demand for and consumption of the goods and services it provides is
to directly determine the benefit such subject derives from those
goods and services. That is, the sovereign can acknowledge that it is a
monopolist providing a highly desirable package of goods and services. Like any monopolist, the sovereign can charge each "purchaser" of such package any price so long as such price does not more
than offset such purchaser's "consumer surplus." Focusing now on a
given subject, what is her consumer surplus? It is the total amount
that she would be willing to pay not to lose the sovereign's package of
goods and services. To determine this amount, it is helpful to perform the following thought experiment. Imagine that the sovereign
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ceases to tax and spend: it simply disappears. 33 How much would the
subject pay to keep that from happening? My intuition tells me that
she would pay nearly the entire amount of her wealth. The reason is
that the result of the sovereign's disappearance would almost surely
be anarchy, a return to the state of nature. And in the state of nature,
most or all of the subject's assets that are valuable in the world where
the sovereign provides its package of goods and services, including
her human capital, would lose most or all of their value. Accordingly:
Proposition 3: The upper bound of the tax a sovereign can impose on
any subject, to reflect such subject's demand for and consumption of the goods and services the sovereign provides, increases
(essentially uniformly) as the subject's wealth increases.
Unlike a tax imposed in the amount of the lower bound set forth
in Proposition 2, a tax imposed in the amount of the upper bound set
forth in Proposition 3 will cover the cost of the goods and services the
sovereign wishes to provide. Indeed, it will generally much more than
cover such cost. Thus, it is feasible for the sovereign to pursue a taxing strategy that takes this upper bound into account. However, the
sovereign will need to abate the tax collections suggested by such upper bound to ensure that its aggregate tax collections equal rather
than exceed the cost of the goods and services it wishes to provide. I
will take up such abatement in a moment. But first it will be fruitful to
convert the suggested wealth-based tax into an income-based tax.
Note that the sovereign's provision of goods and services, and
hence its need to collect taxes, is not, in general, a one-time event.
Rather, the sovereign periodically provides goods and services. 34 And
hence it must periodically collect taxes. Thus, I will assume that the
sovereign establishes a period, such as the taxable year, and for such
period both collects a given amount of taxes and provides a corresponding amount of goods and services. How does the upper bound
of the tax the sovereign can impose on any subject appear under these
assumptions? If the sovereign takes an ex ante perspective, that is, it
collects taxes and provides corresponding goods and services at the
beginning of the period, the upper bound is the subject's wealth at
33

Cf LIAM

MURPHY&

THOMAS

NEAL,

THE MYrH OF OWNERSHIP

16 (2002) ("[T]he

benefit of government services must be understood as the difference between someone's level of welfare in a no-government world and their welfare with government in
place.").
34 In fact, the sovereign can be better viewed as providing goods and services
continuously. However, there is no loss of generality and much gain of simplicity in
assuming instead that it provides such goods and services periodically
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the beginning of the period, or Wb. The reason is simple: in the state
of nature, the subject would lose more or less exactly this amount. If,
instead, the sovereign takes an ex post perspective, that is, it provides
goods and services at the beginning of the period but collects taxes to
pay for them at the end of the period (which taxes are necessarily
grossed-up to reflect the time value of money imposed on its borrowings), the upper bound is the sum of the subject's wealth at the end of
the period and the subject's consumption during the period, or W +
C. After all, in the state of nature that would have resulted had the
sovereign not provided its goods and services, the subject would not
have been able to achieve either her end-of-period wealth or more
than a mere fraction of the consumption she enjoyed during the
period.
Of course, the sovereign cannot generally tax away and spend
and respend and respend again ad infinitum the entire amount of any
subject's wealth. Indeed, if the goods and services the sovereign provides are actually consumed by the subjects to whom they are provided, the sovereign has no ongoing periodic ability to tax and spend
more than the return earned by any subject on her wealth. Thus, if
the sovereign takes the ex ante approach, it could not on an ongoing
periodic basis impose a tax of more than approximately r*Wb, where r
is the riskless rate of return available in the economy during the period. Alternatively, if the sovereign takes the ex post approach, it
could not on an ongoing periodic basis impose a tax of more than (We
- W) + C. It should come as no great surprise to any reader that each
of these amounts is a measure of income the former is the subject's
expected risk-adjusted income during the period in question; the latter is the subject's actual Haig-Simons income during the period in
question. Thus, and with all due emphasis:
Proposition 4: The upper bound of the tax a sovereign can impose on
any subject on an ongoing periodic basis, to reflect such subject's
demand for and consumption of the goods and services the sovereign provides, or more accurately, to reflect such subject's benefit
derived from the goods and services the sovereign provides, increases (essentially uniformly) as the subject's income increases.
Recall that the sovereign will not need to impose a tax equal to
this upper bound on its subjects, since such a tax would leave it with
an undesired budget surplus. Thus, for any given subject, the sovereign should impose a tax that is some fraction (less than one) of the
upper bound. Since the upper bound is a subject's income, it follows
immediately that a "fair" benefits tax can and should be structured as
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an income tax: that is, as a tax that increases as a given subject's income increases. The reason is that only this tax structure will satisfy
the two most widely accepted "fairness" norms of taxation: horizontal
and vertical equity. That is, only an income tax can ensure that every
subject that derives a given amount of benefit from the sovereign's
provision of goods and services (which benefit is by virtue of Propositions 3 and 4 equal to such subject's income) will pay the same
amount of tax as every other subject that derives the same amount of
benefit. And only an income tax can ensure that any subject that derives a greater amount of benefit from the sovereign's provision of
goods and services than does some other subject (which benefit is by
virtue of Propositions 3 and 4 equal to such subject's income) will pay
a greater amount of tax than any other subject.
Conversely, it also follows that any income tax is a "fair" benefits
tax, whether or not the sovereign that imposed such income tax intended to
impose a benefits tax. That is, whether an income tax is progressive, or
proportional, or regressive, it will have as an inherent feature that it
will impose on subjects that derive identical amounts of benefit from
the sovereign's provision of goods and services identical amounts of
tax (since by virtue of Propositions 3 and 4 the amount of any subject's benefit is equal to such subject's income), and it will also have as
an inherent feature that it will impose on subjects that derive greater
amounts of benefit from the sovereign's provision of goods and services greater amounts of tax (again, since by virtue of Propositions 3
and 4 the amount of any subject's benefit is equal to such subject's
income) .35 Thus, I have proven:
Theorem 1: A "fair" tax imposed by a sovereign with respect to the
benefits it provides to its subjects can and should take the form of
an income tax. Conversely, any income tax imposed by a sovereign can be viewed as a "fair" benefits tax.
I will end this subsection with a quick illustration. Suppose that
in Country X there are 101 individuals, and that these individuals an35 Additional norms must be superimposed on the "fair benefits tax" concept in
order for the sovereign to refine the design of its income tax. That is, the benefits tax
concept by itself does nothing more than force the sovereign to bound its tax by the
income generated by its subjects. Superimposing the fairness norm on this structure
then turns the sovereign's tax into an income tax. Superimposing additional norms
might then turn the income tax into a progressive, or proportional, or regressive income tax. Thus, for example, superimposing a social welfare norm might be thought
to lead to a progressive income tax. And superimposing an efficiency norm might be
thought to lead to a regressive income tax. Such refinements will not affect the arguments that I make in this Article, and are hence beyond its scope.
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. 99, and 100, respectively.

Thus, the gross domestic product of Country X is 5050. Suppose that
if Country X reverted to the state of nature, each individual would
annually generate 5 of (necessarily after-tax) income. Thus, the gross
domestic product in the state of nature would be 505. Finally, suppose that the difference between Country X as it is and Country X in
the state of nature is an annual expenditure of 1140 by Country Xs
sovereign on various goods and services. Which individuals benefit
from these goods and services, and how much do they benefit? For
the individual with 0 of pre-tax income, her benefit from Country X's
provision of goods and services is -5. For the individual with 1 of pretax income, her benefit from Country Xs provision of goods and services is -4. And so on. Finally, for the individual with 100 of pre-tax
income, her benefit from Country Xs provision of goods and services
is 95. Note that the first five individuals would actually prefer the state
of nature to civilization, the sixth individual is indifferent between the
state of nature and civilization, and all remaining individuals prefer
civilization to the state of nature. Under these facts, the aggregate
benefit that the individuals who benefit from civilization realize as a
result of Country Xs provision of goods and services is 4560.36 This,
then, is the appropriate aggregate income tax base. Thus, among an
infinite number of other possibilities,Country X's sovereign could fund the
goods and services it provides by means of a 25% tax on positive "taxable income" defined as the excess of any individual's pre-tax income
over the state of nature baseline of 5.37 Note that this tax is "fair" in
that it exhibits both horizontal and vertical equity. I leave it to the
reader to decide whether it also "makes sense."

36 1 +2+...+95=4560.
37 Of course, in the interest of deterring revolution, one of the goods and services
Country Xs sovereign may provide is transfer payments to the individuals who generate less income than they would in the state of nature, so that such individuals do not,
taking taxes and transfer payments into account, ultimately prefer the state of nature.
Alternatively, also in the interest of deterring revolution, one of the goods and services Country X's sovereign may provide is police protection aimed at keeping such
low-income individuals in line. Whichever approach it uses, I want to be quite clear
that it is appropriate to view the amounts spent on the low-income individuals as
being "demanded" not by those individuals, but by the higher-income individuals who
ultimately fund the expenditures. Purely as a matter of political reality, no underclass
has ever had the political clout to demand anything.
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The OccasionalEquivalence of an Integrated Income Tax Regime and
a Double Income Tax Regime

Suppose now that a sovereign views itself, not as providing a single package of goods and services to its subjects, but rather as providing two packages of goods and services. That is, the sovereign notes
that its subjects engage in two very different types of activities, production or business activities and consumption or non-business activities.
It further notes that each of these activities affirmatively benefits from
the goods and services it provides. 38 That is, business activities benefit
from a police force, roads, schools, courts, a social safety net, national
defense, and so on. How? To take just some obvious examples, a police force enables a business to economize on the cost of security
guards; adequate roads allow it to economize on the cost of distributing its products; good schools allow it to economize on the cost of
training workers; functioning courts allow it to economize on the cost
of defending its intellectual property; and an adequate social safety
net and a strong national defense enable it to engage in long-term
projects that would be unimaginable in an environment without significant social stability. 39 Similarly, non-business activities benefit
from a police force, roads, schools, courts, a social safety net, national
defense, and so on. How? Again, to take just a few obvious examples,
a police force enables an individual to economize on the cost of protecting her residence; adequate roads allow her to economize on the
cost of visiting her friends; good schools allow her to economize on
the cost of educating her children; functioning courts allow her to
economize on the cost of resolving any disputes she might have with
her neighbors; and an adequate social safety net and a strong national
defense enable her to sleep well at night.40
38 See HARRIS, supra note 32, at 446. Harris divides government services into
those that are "production related" and those that are "consumption related," at least
for purposes of analyzing multinational income. Id.
39 I include in a social safety net all manner of "redistributive" transfers to lowincome individuals. Aside from reducing the likelihood of civil unrest, such transfers
provide a significant additional benefit to business activity since these transfers tend
to increase aggregate demand for the goods and services produced by businesses:
individuals receiving redistributive transfers tend to annually spend the entirety of the
resources that are available to them.
40 With respect to the income redistribution implicit in a social safety net, an
individual paying for such redistribution may well receive benefits in addition to those
flowing from social stability (that is, the ability to sleep well at night). For example,
she may receive a psychic benefit-an easing of her conscience-from the knowledge
that she has aided the poor. Cf Louis Kaplow, FiscalFederalism and the Deductibility of
State and Local Taxes Under the FederalIncome Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 476-77 (1996).
In addition, the individual will generally receive a tangible benefit from the insurance
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How would a sovereign that views itself as providing two packages
of benefits, one that aids business activity and one that aids non-business activity, incorporate this view into its tax structure? First, based
on some ultimately arbitrary perception of the relative amount of benefit it provides to businesses and to individuals, the sovereign would
need to decide how much of its total revenue needs will be satisfied by
each of those two constituencies. Then, following the framework developed in the preceding subsection, the sovereign would establish
the upper bound of the tax it could impose on any business and on
any individual to reflect such business' and such individual's benefit
derived from all of the various goods and services it provides. Finally,
assuming that the aggregate upper bound of tax that could be imposed on all businesses exceeds the amount of revenue the sovereign
has decided to collect from businesses, and assuming likewise that the
aggregate upper bound of tax that could be imposed on all individuals exceeds the amount of revenue the sovereign has decided to collect from individuals, the sovereign would need to import other
values, such as fairness and efficiency, to actually structure its tax.
I will, for now, ignore the first step in the sovereign's process, and
assume that it has simply decided to impose a certain tax burden on
businesses and a certain tax burden on individuals. Proceeding to the
second step, the sovereign must establish the upper bound of the tax
it could impose on any given business. Its analysis will be identical to
the analysis elaborated in the prior subsection. Thus, the sovereign
will observe that if it disappeared and the state of nature ensued, the
business' various assets would become essentially worthless. If this
happened, the persons who hold actual or inchoate claims against
such assets-the business' employees, landlords, lenders, equity owners and other stakeholders-would see the value of their claims fall to
zero. Thus, the stakeholders would be willing to pay any amount up
to the value of their claims to keep the sovereign from disappearing.
Or, equivalently, the business would be willing to pay any amount up
to the aggregate value of its (gross) assets to keep the sovereign from
disappearing.
But as in the prior subsection, the upper bound of the tax the
sovereign can impose on any business must be tempered by the reality
that the sovereign will want to periodically provide goods and services
to businesses and hence will want to periodically collect taxes from
such businesses. If so, it will not be able on an ongoing periodic basis
aspect of the social safety net: although she may not at the moment be a net recipient
of redistributive payments, circumstances may make her such in the future.
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to tax away and spend more than the entire amount of income generated by the business' assets. This, then, is the relevant upper bound:
Proposition 5: The upper bound of the tax a sovereign can impose on
any business on an ongoing periodic basis, to reflect such business' benefit derived from the goods and services the sovereign
provides, increases (essentially uniformly) as the business' income increases.
It is important to emphasize that the notion of a business' income
employed in Proposition 5 is not the same as the notion of taxable
income under the current U.S. corporate income tax. That is, the
notion of a business' income in Proposition 5 includes all returns generated by the business and payable to any of its stakeholders. Thus,
this notion is essentially congruent with the notion of income under
the so-called entity income tax. 4 1 In particular, and unlike the notion
of taxable income under the current U.S. corporate income tax, a business' income would not be reduced by payments the business makes
to its various stakeholders. Thus, for example, the interest paid by a
business to its lenders and the wages paid by a business to its employees would not be deductible.
Once the sovereign has established the upper bound of tax it can
impose on any business, it must determine what tax it will actually
impose, given the reality that its revenue needs will be only a fraction
of the upper bound. To answer this question, it must, as in the prior
subsection, import additional norms. Assuming the first of these is
"fairness," it again follows that the actual tax must be an income tax.
That is, horizontal equity dictates that if two businesses generate identical amounts of income, and thus by definition derive identical
amounts of benefit from the sovereign's provision of goods and services, they should each pay the same amount of tax. And vertical equity dictates that if one business generates a greater amount of
income than another, and thus by definition derives a greater amount
of benefit from the sovereign's provision of goods and services than
the other, it should pay a greater amount of tax than the other.
In addition, unlike in the case of the income tax derived in the
prior subsection, in the case of this income tax on business activity it is
not really possible to be agnostic as to whether such tax should be
progressive, proportional, or regressive. That is, the most elementary
application of an efficiency norm dictates that such tax must be pro41 See Schlunk, supra note 3, at 382. But see HARRIs, supra note 32, at 455-56
(observing that "business does not receive different levels of government services depending on the form in which their income is distributed").
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portional. Why? Suppose that an individual owning a particular set of
productive assets can equally well make such assets available to either
of two businesses, one large and one small. In either case, her assets
will enable the business making use of them to generate identical
amounts of incremental pre-tax income. If the larger business is subject to a higher marginal tax rate, the individual will make her assets
available to the smaller business. If the larger business is subject to a
lower marginal tax rate, the individual will make her assets available to
it. Only if both businesses are subject to the same marginal tax rate
will the individual make her assets available to one or the other on the
basis of non-tax considerations. Since there is no reason for the sovereign to want to have any stake in the individual's choice, it must impose a business income tax that does not encourage or discourage
either outcome. Thus, it must impose a proportional business income
tax. 4 2 Thus, I have:
Proposition 6: A fair and efficient benefits tax imposed on business
activity must take the form of a proportional business income tax
imposed on all businesses.
Once the sovereign has established the structure of the tax it will
impose with respect to the benefits it provides to business activity, it
must establish the structure of the tax it will impose with respect to
the benefits it provides to non-business activity. How does it do that?
It follows the reasoning and the template of the prior subsection.
Thus, it will impose an income tax on its individual subjects (for only
individuals are capable of having non-business capacities). But note
that, for this purpose, an individual's "income" must be reduced to
the extent that such individual has (indirectly) paid an amount of business income tax. The reason, quite simply, is that an individual
would neither be willing nor able to pay all of its pre-business-incometax income twice to avoid the state of nature. Rather, in her capacity
as a stakeholder in a business, she would be willing to pay all of her
pre-business-income-tax income. Then, to the extent that the sovereign does not confiscate this entire amount, she would, in her capacity
as an individual consumer, be willing to pay such non-confiscated
amount. It follows that the appropriate upper bound for the individual income tax is an individual's after-business-income-tax income.
Thus:
42 See HARRIS, supra note 32, at 457. Harris similarly derives the need for a proportional income tax on the business income of nonresidents. Id. His argument,
however, is based on the norm of ability-to-pay. Id.
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Proposition 7: A fair benefits tax imposed on individuals by a sovereign that separately imposes a tax with respect to the benefits it
provides to businesses will take the form of an individual income
tax, where "individual income" is defined as an individual's afterbusiness-income-tax income.
It is now possible to prove:
Theorem 2 (Equivalence): Suppose that a sovereign reigns in a country that is isolated from the rest of the world: the country has no
international trade of any sort. And suppose further that all income generated by the sovereign's subjects is generated by business activity. And suppose finally that all business activity is either
formally conducted by entities or can be deemed to be so conducted. Then a fair benefits tax imposed with respect to the benefits individuals derive from the sovereign's provision of goods
and services can be structured either as an integrated income tax
imposed on each individual's income, 4 3 or as a double income
tax pursuant to which a proportional "entity" income tax is imposed on each entity's income and an "individual" income tax is
imposed on each individual's after-entity-income-tax income.
The proof is as follows. Suppose, first, that the sovereign has enacted a well-defined and well-behaved integrated income tax regime.
In particular, by definition, an individual with more income will pay
more tax than an individual with less income. So consider two individuals, J and K, who each engage in business activity (by definition, in
an entity) and who thereby (indirectly) generate pre-tax income of Bj
and BK, respectively. If Bj > BK, then Tj > TK, where T is the amount of
integrated income tax paid by J and TK is the amount of integrated
income tax paid by K Let 2*r4 be the lowest marginal income tax rate
imposed by the sovereign under its integrated income tax. I assume
that 2*t > 0.44
I will now construct a double income tax regime that is equivalent
to the sovereign's integrated income tax regime. First, I will impose a
43 The current partnership income tax regime fits this description. See I.R.C.
§§ 701-777 (2000). A tax regime that is integrated by means of a dividend exclusion
does not, however, since the tax rate imposed by such regime on some income is not
the individual marginal income tax rate.
44 This follows because I treat redistributive transfers as occurring outside of the
tax system (they are goods and services provided by the sovereign). Thus, all individuals, even those at the low end of the income scale, can be deemed to pay tax at a
positive rate. They might simply, after paying tax, receive transfers that are as great as
or greater than the amount of tax they paid.
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proportional business income tax at the rate of t,. Since the integrated income tax regime is assumed to be a well-defined and wellbehaved income tax regime, the highest, and a fortiori the lowest,
marginal income tax rate must be less than 100%. Thus, 0 < 2*t, < 1

and so 0 < t, < 1. Accordingly, my business income tax is also a welldefined and a well-behaved income tax.
Second, I will impose a tax on J's individual income, which is
equal to her after-business-income-tax income, or (1 - t)*Bj, in the
amount Tj - te*B. Likewise, I will impose a tax on Ks individual income, which is equal to her after-business-income-tax income, or (1 t,)*BK, in the amount TK - te*BK. I claim that this individual income
tax is well-defined and well-behaved. From 0 < te < 1, it follows that 0 <
(1 - t) < 1. Since, by hypothesis, Bj > BK, it follows that (1 - t,)*Bj > (1 -

t,)*BK. In other words, if J generates more business income than K,
she will also generate more after-business-income-tax income, in spite
of the business income tax. The question is thus whether she will necessarily also pay more individual income tax. Note that T - TK> te*(B
- BK), since teis lower than the lowest marginal income tax rate im-

posed by the integrated income tax regime. Rearranging terms yields
Tj - t,*Bj > TK-

t.*BK. Thus, the individual income tax I have con-

structed is indeed well-defined and well-behaved.
Conversely, suppose that, under the given predicates, the sovereign has chosen to enact a well-defined and well-behaved double income tax regime. And suppose that the business income tax
component of such regime imposes tax at the rate of t, on each entity's business income. Let Jand K be two individuals who (by definition) invest their assets in entities and suppose that such entities are
able to generate B and BK, respectively, of pre-tax income as a result
of such investments. Thus, the entities will pay entity income tax of
te*Bj and t,*BK, respectively, with respect to such income, and will be
able to allocate or distribute ( 1 - t)*Bj and ( 1 - t)*BK, respectively, of
after-entity-income-tax income, or individual income, to J and K
With respect to such individual income, suppose that the sovereign
imposes an individual income tax of t on J and an individual income
tax of t K on K

Needless to say, in order to replicate this double income tax regime with an integrated income tax regime, I must impose an income
tax burden of t*B + tj on J's integrated income of B and an income
tax burden of t,*BK + tK on Ks integrated income of BK. The only
question is whether this integrated income tax is a well-defined and
well-behaved income tax. Thus, suppose that Bj > BK:. Since the business income tax component of the double income tax regime is welldefined and well-behaved, it follows that both t*Bj > t,*BKand (1 -
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te)*B > (1 - t,)*BK. As the individual income tax component of the

double income tax regime is also well-defined and well-behaved, the
second of these inequalities implies that t > tK. Putting pieces together, it follows that t,*Bj + tj > te*BK + tK. Thus, the integrated income tax is a well-defined and well-behaved income tax. QED.
Of course, in spite of this formal equivalence of an integrated
income tax regime and a double income tax regime, an important
difference will remain between the two. Specifically, the former imposes a single income tax that is reported on a single income tax return, while the latter imposes two income taxes that are reported on
two income tax returns. This difference means that a double income
tax regime will almost inevitably be accompanied by incremental administrative costs: additional paperwork, more chances for dispute
and error, etc. When these costs are considered, it may cease to be
true that a double income tax regime that is ostensibly equivalent to
an integrated income tax regime is in fact equivalent to such integrated income tax regime. Accordingly, a sovereign would be welladvised if it hesitates before imposing separate taxes to separately
charge its subjects for the goods and services it provides in their business and in their non-business capacities.
I should also add that, even if a double income tax regime were
fully equivalent to an integrated income tax regime, taking administrative costs into account, it would still be the case that, under the predicates set forth above, no sensible sovereign should actually choose to
enact a double income tax regime. The reason is that such enactment
would represent nothing more than a triumph of meaningless form
over substance: it would impose double income taxation solely for the
sake of imposing double income taxation. That is, the double income
tax regime constructed above, however theoretically sound it may be,
misses the entire point of double income taxation, which is not to tax
all income twice, but merely to tax some income twice. Rational
double income taxation, as opposed to such merely formal double
income taxation, will thus require relaxation of some of my predicates. In particular, it will require a sovereign to be able to distinguish
between different types of income, and it will require a reason for the
sovereign to select only certain such types of income for double taxation. These elements will be discussed at length below.
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C. Enter King Midas45
My analysis so far, and hence the demonstrated equivalence of
any integrated income tax regime and an alternative double income
tax regime, 46 ultimately rests on the fact that all income generated by
the sovereign's subjects is generated by local business activity. But
suppose it is not. Suppose that the sovereign becomes aware that King
Midas has taken up residence in its domain. Midas differs from the
sovereign's other subjects in that he is able to produce income without engaging in anything that the sovereign would classify as local business activity. That is, while his activity may be local, the sovereign
does not deem it to be business activity. It turns out that this single
divergence of "all income" from "all income generated by local business activity" is sufficient to destroy the equivalence between an integrated income tax regime and any double income tax regime.
To see this, consider an individual J,who generates the same
amount of pre-tax income as Midas. J,however, generates all of her
income by means of local business activity. Suppose, first, that the
sovereign imposes tax by means of an integrated income tax regime.
In defining the tax base for such regime, it has two choices: it can
either include Midas' income in the tax base, or it can exclude Midas'
income from the tax base. In the former case, Midas and J will pay
identical amounts of tax. The justification for this result would be a
belief that Midas and J derive identical benefits from the sovereign's
provision of goods and services: all of their activities, business and
non-business alike, are given a refuge from the state of nature, and
the value of that refuge is equal to their pre-tax income. In the latter
case, Jwould pay income tax, but Midas would not. The justification
for this result would be a belief (untenable, in my opinion) that only
local business activity derives a benefit from the sovereign's provision
of goods and services.
Now suppose that the sovereign enacts a double income tax regime. Its reason for doing so would be a belief that it provides its
45

See generally HARRIS, supra note 32. Harris' concern is with the allocation of

taxing rights between countries. Thus, he derives an ideal "composite" income tax to
be applied to multinational income. This composite income tax, which, like the
double income tax I derive below is based on benefits principles, is, as applied to
multinational income, identical to my double income tax. Harris, however, fails to
observe that the very derivation of his composite income tax implies that it can and
should be extended to the purely domestic context.
46 Under my predicates, any integrated income tax regime is actually equivalent
to an infinite number of double income tax regimes. To see this, simply replace the
for
lowest marginal income tax rate under the integrated income tax regime with - *t,
any o > 1.
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subjects not with one package of goods and services, but with two: it
provides its subjects with a refuge from the state of nature for their
business (production) activities and it provides its subjects with a refuge from the state of nature for their non-business (consumption)
activities. Note that J, but not Midas, benefits from receiving a refuge
from the state of nature for her business activity. Thus, J, but not
Midas, would be subject to the business/corporate/entity income tax
component of the sovereign's double income tax regime. So long as
the amount of this tax is positive, it follows that Jwould have less afterbusiness-income-tax income than Midas. Furthermore, since afterbusiness-income-tax income would be the tax base for the individual
income tax component of the sovereign's double income tax regime,
it follows that Jwould pay less individual income tax than Midas. (The
justification for this result is that J's non-business activity receives less
benefit from the sovereign's provision of goods and services than does
Midas' non-business activity.) However, so long as individual marginal
income tax rates are less than 100%, she will not pay sufficiently less
individual income tax to completely offset the amount of business income tax she indirectly paid. Thus, when all is said and done, J's
aggregate (indirect and direct) tax burden under the double income
tax regime would be greater than Midas', and Midas' aggregate (indirect and direct) tax burden would be greater than zero. These results
are different from those produced by an integrated income tax regime, irrespective of how such regime decides to tax Midas. Thus, the
possibility for equivalence has disappeared.
Now suppose that instead of discovering Midas, the sovereign discovers Sisyphus in its domain. Sisyphus differs from the sovereign's
other subjects in that he engages in local business activity that generates a significant amount of income, but neither he nor anyone else,
other than the sovereign, can consume any of such income. That is,
the income generated by Sisyphus, if not immediately taxed, vanishes.
Thus, the amount of income generated by Sisyphus' local business activity differs from his individual income (as measured, for example,
under Haig-Simons precepts). As was the case with King Midas, this
single divergence is sufficient to destroy the equivalence between an
integrated income tax regime and any double income tax regime.
To see this, consider an individual, J, who generates the same
amount of pre-tax income as Sisyphus. Suppose, first, that the sovereign imposes tax by means of an integrated income tax regime. In
defining the tax base for such a regime, it has two choices: it can either include Sisyphus' income in the tax base, or it can exclude Sisyphus' income from the tax base. In the former case, Sisyphus and J
will pay identical amounts of tax. The justification for this result
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would be a belief that Sisyphus and Jderive identical benefits from the
sovereign's provision of goods and services: all of their activities, business and non-business alike, are given a refuge from the state of nature, the value of that refuge is equal to their pre-tax income, and the
fact that Sisyphus is constitutionally unable to enjoy any of his income
is unfortunate but beside the point. In the latter case, J would pay
income tax, but Sisyphus would not. The justification for this result
would be a belief (untenable, in my opinion) that only non-business
activity ultimately derives a benefit from the sovereign's provision of
goods and services.
Now suppose that the sovereign enacts a double income tax regime. Once again, its reason for doing so would be a belief that it
provides its subjects not with one package of goods and services, but
with two: it provides its subjects with a refuge from the state of nature
for their business activities and it provides its subjects with a refuge
from the state of nature for their non-business activities. Note that
Sisyphus and Jboth derive an identical amount of benefit from receiving a refuge from the state of nature for their business activities.
Thus, Sisyphus and J would pay identical amounts of tax under the
business/corporate/entity income tax component of the sovereign's
double income tax regime. But there the identity ends. That is, it is
impossible to claim that Sisyphus and J derive an identical benefit
from receiving a refuge from the state of nature for their non-business
activities. Sisyphus receives no such benefit at all. Thus, Sisyphus' individual income for purposes of the individual income tax component
of the sovereign's double income tax regime would be zero, and he
would pay no individual income tax. J, on the other hand, receives an
affirmative benefit, in an amount equal to her after-business-incometax income, from receiving a refuge from the state of nature for her
non-business activity. Thus, so long as individual marginal income tax
rates are positive, it follows that J's aggregate (indirect and direct) tax
burden under the double income tax regime would be greater than
Sisyphus', and Sisyphus' aggregate (indirect and direct) tax burden
would be greater than zero. These results are different from those
produced by an integrated income tax regime, irrespective of how
such regime decides to tax Sisyphus. Thus, the possibility for equivalence has disappeared. I have proven:
Theorem 3 (Nonequivalence): If either some of the income generated by a sovereign's subjects is not generated by local business
activity, or some of the income generated by the local business
activity of a sovereign's subjects is not available for consumption
by the sovereign's subjects, then an integrated income tax im-
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posed by the sovereign will not be equivalent to any double income tax that is composed of a proportional "entity" income tax
imposed on each subject entity's local business income and an
"individual" income tax imposed on each individual subject's after-entity-income-tax consumable income.
Of course, King Midas and Sisyphus are mythical figures. But real
world analogs for them exist. For example, in a purely domestic context, it is possible to analogize an individual who accidentally discovers
treasure with Midas and an individual who suffers an uninsurable casualty loss with Sisyphus. Much more significantly, in a cross-border
context, it is possible to analogize any individual who resides in one
sovereign's domain but who employs some of her capital and labor in
a second sovereign's domain with Midas. To the extent that her capital and labor are employed in the second sovereign's domain, the individual does not engage in business activity in the first sovereign's
domain. But, to the extent that her capital and labor employed in the
second sovereign's domain generate (after-tax) income that she effectively repatriates, she does engage in non-business (consumption) activity in the first sovereign's domain. Similarly, it is possible to
analogize any individual who resides in the second sovereign's domain, but who employs some of her capital or labor in the first sovereign's domain, with Sisyphus. To the extent that her capital and labor
are employed in the first sovereign's domain, she is engaged in business activity in such domain. But to the extent that her after-tax business income is effectively repatriated to the second sovereign's
domain, she does not engage in any non-business (consumption) activity in the first sovereign's domain.
Given the prevalence of such real world analogs to King Midas
and Sisyphus, and given the nonequivalence of integrated income tax
regimes and double income tax regimes in the face of such analogs, it
is incumbent on every sovereign to choose, with the full knowledge
that its choice will have real consequences, whether to impose an integrated income tax regime or a double income tax regime. How
should it make this choice? It seems to me that the only principled
way to make this choice is on the basis of which tax regime better
reflects reality. That is, is it a better reflection of reality to say that the
sovereign provides a single package of goods and services to all of its
subjects, or is it a better reflection of reality to say that the sovereign
provides one package of goods and services to its subjects in their business capacities and one package of goods and services to its subjects in
their non-business capacities? Of course, this is not an easy question
to answer.
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For example, the sovereign might build a road with the primary
intention of making it easier for individuals to visit one another (that
is, to engage in non-business activity). But the very same road will
invariably also make it cheaper for businesses to deliver their products
to such individuals (that is, engage in business activity). Conversely,
the sovereign might build a road with the primary intention of making it cheaper for businesses to deliver their products to individuals.
But the very same road will invariably also make it easier for individuals to visit one another. In both of these cases, the sovereign's intention to provide the road primarily to benefit business activity or
primarily to benefit non-business activity cannot adequately be captured by an integrated income tax regime, assuming any divergence
between individuals engaged in business activity and those engaged in
non-business activity. However, the actual result of the sovereign's provision of the road-benefits to both business activity and to non-business activity-at first blush can be so captured.
Now consider a device that the sovereign installs in all factories to
monitor factories' emissions of noxious gasses. Such a device would
be intended to improve the quality of the air breathed by individuals
residing in the sovereign's domain, and so to provide non-business
benefits. Moreover, since such device might well make it more expensive for businesses to manufacture their products, it would be highly
disingenuous to say that amounts spent by the sovereign on the device
provide a benefit to business activity. Conversely, the sovereign might
install a device in the factories of all businesses that improves such
factories' efficiency, but that also increases the factories' emissions of
noxious gasses. Such a device would clearly be intended to provide a
benefit to the businesses operating in the sovereign's domain. Moreover, since such device might well decrease the utility of individuals
living in the sovereign's domain, it would be highly disingenuous to
say that amounts spent by the sovereign on the device provide a benefit to non-business activity. In these examples, neither the sovereign's
intention nor the actual result of the sovereign's provision of the device
can be adequately captured by an integrated income tax regime, assuming any divergence between individuals engaged in business activity and those engaged in non-business activity.
Finally, consider again a road built by the sovereign, and suppose
that the sovereign intends the road to benefit both business activity
and non-business activity; suppose, in fact, that the road does benefit
both business activity and non-business activity. Does it follow, at
more than first blush, that an integrated income tax can be imposed
that will adequately capture both the sovereign's intention with respect
to such road and the actual result produced by such road? It does not.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

(VOL- 79:1

For example, suppose the road is used equally often by every individual engaged in business activity and by every individual engaged in
non-business activity. In that case, an individual engaged only in business activity, or only in non-business activity, derives less benefit from
the road than does an individual engaged in both business activity and
non-business activity. There is no way for an integrated income tax
regime to adequately capture this difference.
This final point, albeit viewed in terms of the entire package of
goods and services provided by the sovereign, rather than in terms of
a single road, is ultimately the decisive one. That is, the sovereign in
reality provides a single package of goods and services: neither businesses nor individuals can cherry-pick which goods and services they
want to receive and hence to pay for. The sovereign's intention in
providing its package of goods and services is-broadly speaking-to
benefit both those engaged in business activity and those engaged in
non-business activity. And the sovereign's package of goods and services generally does indeed benefit both those engaged in business
activity and those engaged in non-business activity. Does it follow that
an integrated income tax can be imposed that will adequately capture
both the sovereign's intention with respect to the package and the
actual result produced by such package? It does not. Exactly as in the
case of the road in the prior paragraph, an individual can make use of
the sovereign's package in a business capacity, in a non-business capacity, or in both a business capacity and a non-business capacity. To
the extent that an individual makes use of the sovereign's package
only in a business capacity, or only in a non-business capacity, she derives less benefit from the package than does an otherwise identical
individual who makes use of the package both in a business capacity
and in a non-business capacity. And there is no way for an integrated
income tax regime to adequately capture this difference.
An alternative way of reaching the same conclusion, at least in a
world with individuals who have cross-border contacts, is by focusing
on the confiscatory power of the sovereign. Harking back to the illustration in Part I, consider K, who is a resident of HighTax but who
conducts all of her business activity in LowTax. If LowTax's sovereign
had a policy of confiscating all of the income generated by business
activity conducted in LowTax, Kwould not conduct any business activity there. And so, at the end of the day, LowTax could not in fact
confiscate all of the income generated by Ks business activity. In
other words, the upper bound of tax that LowTax can impose on Ks
business activity is actually less than the entire amount of income generated by such business activity. But that is just another way of saying
that, although K manifestly benefits from the goods and services pro-
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vided by LowTax, she benefits less than does an otherwise identical
resident of LowTax who also conducts all of her business activity in
LowTax. And so she should pay less tax. Under an integrated income
tax regime, however, she would not, absent a special dispensation. I
illustrated the inadequacy of such special dispensations in Part I.B.,
and I will discuss them further in Part II.D.
Now consider J, who is a resident of LowTax but who conducts all
of her business activity in HighTax. If LowTax's sovereign had a policy of confiscating all of the income generated by its residents,
whether or not such income is generated by business activity conducted in LowTax, it would run into a problem with respect to J That
is, since HighTax gets the first tax bite at the apple of J's income,
LowTax could not, in fact, confiscate J's entire pre-HighTax-tax income. Rather, the upper bound of tax that LowTax can impose on J
is the entire amount of J's income reduced by the taxes J pays to
HighTax, and this is, of course, less than the entire amount of J's
income. But that is just another way of saying that although J manifestly benefits from the goods and services provided by LowTax, she
actually benefits less than does an otherwise identical resident of
LowTax who also conducts all of her business activity in LowTax. And
so she should pay less tax. Under an integrated income tax regime,
however, she would not, again absent a special dispensation.
Of course, the mere existence of a compelling theoretical tax relevant difference between individuals is not necessarily a sufficient reason for a real world sovereign to take such difference into account in
constructing its tax regime. Rather, the question with respect to any
compelling theoretical tax-relevant difference is one of cost and benefit. What is the cost of classifying individuals? What is the benefit
from doing so? To return to King Midas and Sisyphus, perhaps they
are easy to identify and perhaps they are not, but in general it is unlikely that it would make sense (in a cost-benefit sense) to choose one
type of tax regime over another simply on the basis that it more properly taxes these two peculiar individuals. In the case of inbound investors and outbound investors, however, identification should generally
be easy. Moreover, in the modern world, with its large and ever-growing amount of international commerce, the number of such investors
is large and getting larger. Thus, it seems quite likely that it would
make sense (in a cost-benefit sense) to choose one type of tax regime
over another on the basis that it more properly taxes such individuals.
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Constructing an Ideal Income Tax Regime

Two things follow from the foregoing discussion of cross-border
investors. First, in the case of an inbound investor, the sovereign
should impose an income tax on the investor's local business-generated income in an amount that is less than the aggregate amount of
income tax that the sovereign imposes on an identical amount of local
business-generated income earned by a resident. Second, in the case
of an outbound investor, a sovereign should impose an income tax
only on the investor's after-foreign-tax income. 47 I claim that this
structure is implicitly a double income tax structure. Moreover, given
the need to explicitly impose this implicit double income tax structure
on both inbound and outbound investors, there is no reason not to
explicitly impose this double income tax structure more generally on
48
all individuals.
That is, by virtue of Proposition 6, the type of tax that a sovereign
should impose on an inbound investor's local business activity is a proportional business income tax. Assuming the sovereign imposes such
a tax, it can, at no significant additional administrative cost, and in
keeping with the horizontal and vertical equity norms, impose an
identical proportional business income tax on the income generated
by its own residents' local business activity. In other words, and without implying any congruence to the current U.S. income tax regime,
it could impose a "corporate" income tax, or more correctly an "entity" income tax, on all income generated by any business activity conducted by any entity within its borders, where it would further by fiat
47 See HARRIS, supra note 32, at 466 (noting that "it is correct to include in taxable
income foreign income net of foreign (source) taxes").
48 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Harris misses this point. After he
constructs an income tax regime applicable to persons with multinational contacts
that is essentially identical to the one I derive, he overlooks that this tax regime is,
from a domestic perspective, nothing other than a double income tax regime. Moreover, he misses the administrative simplicity that would be gained by actually implementing his regime through overt double taxation. Thus, for example, he constructs
an elaborate mechanism to ensure that residents pay the proper amount of tax with
respect to foreign source income. See HARRIS, supra note 32, at 460-70. That mechanism involves: (1) grossing up after-foreign-tax foreign source income by the tax rate
generally applied to the domestic income earned by nonresidents (i.e., to use my
language, the corporate income tax rate); and (2) allowing a "foreign" tax credit with
respect to the domestic tax imposed on such grossed-up income, which tax credit is in
the amount of the tax rate generally applied to the domestic income earned by nonresidents (again, to use my language, the corporate income tax rate). The net effect
of this complicated two-step is simply to impose what I call the individual income tax
on after-foreign-tax foreign source income.
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deem all income generated by any business activity conducted within
its borders to be generated by an entity.
Assuming the sovereign follows this tack, what is the appropriate
individual income tax for it to impose? I already asserted that it needs
to impose a tax on an outbound investor in an amount that is determined by the investor's after-foreign-tax income, since this amount
fully determines the amount of benefit the outbound investor receives
from the sovereign's provision of benefits to her (necessarily exclusively) non-business activity. In keeping with the horizontal and vertical equity norms, the question becomes: what resident receives exactly
the same amount of benefit from the sovereign's provision of benefits
to her non-business activity as does the outbound investor? And the
answer is: any resident who generates an amount of after-entity-income-tax income that is equal to the outbound investor's after-foreign-tax income. The reason, as noted in Proposition 7, is that the
individual's after-entity-income-tax income fully determines the
amount of benefit she receives from the sovereign's provision of benefits to her non-business activity.
But note what this means. For an individual without any international contacts, the appropriate aggregate income tax burden is produced by imposing an entity income tax on her business-generated
income and then by imposing an individual income tax on her afterentity-income-tax income. In other words, the appropriate aggregate
income tax burden is produced by imposing, on all individuals without international contacts, the equivalent of a double income tax regime! Thus, I have demonstrated:
Theorem 4 (Necessary Double Taxation): If a sovereign wishes to impose a fair tax burden upon its subjects with international contacts, it must impose the equivalent of a double income tax
regime on its subjects without international contacts. The corporate income tax component of such double income tax regime
will consist of a proportional tax imposed on business income,
which tax is imposed at the same rate as the tax imposed by the
sovereign on the business income of inbound investors. The individual income tax component of such double income tax regime
will consist of a tax imposed on after-corporate-income-tax income, which tax will be imposed at the same rate (or according to
the same schedule) as the tax imposed by the sovereign on the
after-foreign-tax income of outbound investors.
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Alternatively, separating the various components of this ideal
double income tax regime, I have reproduced the tax rules I announced in Part I.C:
(1) A country should impose its "corporate" income tax on all of
the income generated by any business activity conducted within such
country's borders, whether or not the owners of such business activity
reside in such country. The reason is that the country can and does
provide benefits to the business activities that generate such income;
(2) A country should exempt from its "corporate" income tax all
of the income generated by any business activity conducted outside of
such country's borders, even if the owners of such business activity
reside in such country. The reason is that the country neither can nor
does provide any (significant) benefits to such business activity;
(3) A country should impose its "individual" income tax on all of
the after-corporate-income-tax income generated by its residents,
whether or not such income is generated by business activity conducted within such country's borders. The reason is that the country
can and does provide benefits to the residents who (indirectly) generated such income; and
(4) A country should exempt from its "individual" income tax all
of the after-corporate-income-tax income generated by its nonresidents, even if such income is generated by a business activity conducted within such country's borders. The reason is that the country
neither can nor does provide any (significant) benefits with respect to
such individuals' non-business activity. 49
One point bears repeating. I have not only demonstrated that
double income taxation produces the appropriate results, both for
those individuals with international contacts and for those individuals
without international contacts, I have also demonstrated that any tax
regime that produces the appropriate result is equivalent to a double
income tax regime. In particular, by virtue of Theorem 3, an integrated income tax regime cannot produce the appropriate results.
Moreover, an integrated income tax regime that has simply been
"tweaked" so that it properly taxes individuals with international contacts can never produce the appropriate results. That is, appropriate
results are not produced by an integrated income tax regime that contains the following two "small" adjustments: nonresidents are subject
49

I repudiate the reasoning in Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924), that justifies

the individual income taxation of nonresident citizens. While it is true, at least in

theory, that the United States provides some non-business benefits to such nonresidents, the amount of such benefits is sufficiently de minimis that, in my opinion,
taxing such nonresidents as if they were residents cannot be justified.
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to a flat rate (proportional) withholding tax on all income they receive from business activity conducted within the sovereign's domain,
and residents are entitled to an income tax deduction for any foreign
income taxes they pay with respect to business activity they conduct
outside of the sovereign's domain. The proof is as follows. Consider
two individuals who, under this tweaked integrated income tax structure, each have the same amount of integrated taxable income. One
has invested domestically; the other has not and has accordingly had
her taxable income reduced by virtue of the deduction for foreign
income taxes paid. Both of these individuals would pay an identical
amount of domestic income tax. But these two individuals have not in
fact received an identical amount of benefit from the sovereign's provision of goods and services. That is, the latter individual has received
no benefits from the sovereign with respect to her business activity;
rather she has received and paid for benefits provided by another sovereign. On the other hand, the former individual has received benefits from the sovereign with respect to her business activity. Thus,
unless the sovereign reaches the conclusion that the appropriate tax
with respect to business benefits is zero, the tweaked integrated in50
come tax will not tax these individuals appropriately.
E. Space and Time
In the foregoing discussion, the existence of inbound and outbound investors added a spatial dimension to the question of how to
properly levy an income tax. That is, double taxation became necessary because a sovereign provided benefits to individuals based on the
spatial location of certain activities of such individuals. Thus, the sovereign provided benefits to the business activities of individuals, but
only to the extent that such business activities were conducted within
the sovereign's domain. And the sovereign provided benefits to the
non-business activities of individuals, but only to the extent that such
non-business activities were conducted within the sovereign's domain.
The existence of a spatial dimension to a question frequently
portends the existence of an analogous temporal dimension. Thus,
one can ask: Does double taxation become necessary if a sovereign
provided benefits to individuals based on the temporal "location" of
certain activities of such individuals? In particular, to the extent that
the sovereign provides benefits to the business activities of individuals,
it provides such benefits when the business activities are conducted.
50 If the sovereign does reach the conclusion that the appropriate tax with respect to business benefits is zero, it must set its withholding tax rate for nonresidents
at zero as well.
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And to the extent that the sovereign provides benefits to the nonbusiness activities of individuals, it provides such benefits when the
non-business activities are conducted.
Before embarking on an analysis of the effects of a potential temporal component in the sovereign's provision of benefits, it is fruitful
to analyze the effects of a potential temporal component in the sovereign's imposition of tax. In Part II.B, I proved the Equivalence Theorem (Theorem 2), which states that, under certain predicates
including the absence of international contacts, any integrated income tax regime-technically, any income tax regime that is integrated by means of an allocation mechanism (that is, a mechanism
under which all business income is allocated to various participants in
the business and is taxed directly to such participants)-can be perfectly replicated by a double income tax regime (and vice versa). To
prove the theorem, I began with an arbitrary integrated income tax
regime and constructed a double income tax regime that is equivalent
to it. The resulting double income tax regime consists, naturally
enough, of two components: a "corporate" income tax that is imposed
on all business-generated income, and an "individual" income tax that
is imposed on all after-tax business-generated income. Thus, although my proof did not explicitly mention this fact, the resulting
double income tax regime does not allow for the deferral of any portion of the individual income tax that must be imposed on after-tax
business-generated income. In particular, all such income, whether
allocable to employees (wages), creditors (interest), or equity owners
(dividends and/or retained earnings), is immediately taxed to such
participants as it was earned.
The double income tax regime under current law does not, of
course, share this feature. For example, the individual income tax
component of such double income tax regime is subject to various
types of deferral. Most significantly, employees can defer compensation income that is deflected into retirement plans and equity owners
can defer dividend income to the extent that a corporation retains
earnings. Since allowing such deferral is clearly not a necessary feature of a double income tax regime, the result in Theorem 2 remains
unaffected. But it is interesting to note that the result in Theorem 2
would generally change in the face of deferral opportunities. Thus:
Theorem 5: Assume the predicates stated in Theorem 2. Then a fair
benefits tax that is structured as an integrated income tax imposed on each individual's income will be equivalent to a double
income tax pursuant to which a proportional "entity" income tax
is imposed on each entity's income, and an "individual" income
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tax is imposed on each individual's after-entity-income-tax income if, and only if, all after-entity-income-tax income is subject
to an "identical" amount of "deferral."
The proof is straightforward. The economic effect of deferral is to
reduce the effective individual income tax rate applied to after-entityincome-tax income. If all after-entity-income-tax income is subject to
an identical amount of deferral, the effective individual income tax
rate applied to all such income will fall by the same amount. Accordingly, in the proof of Theorem 2, the construction of the individual
income tax rate schedule can proceed as before, but with a simple
adjustment (that is, a gross-up) to take the alternative effective tax rate
into account. Conversely, if different types of after-entity-income-tax
income are subject to different amounts of deferral, they are subject
to different effective individual income taK rates. Thus, a single quantity of pre-tax business-generated income allocable to a given individual can be subject, under a double income tax regime, to more than
one effective income tax rate (combining the uniform proportional
business income tax rate with the variable individual income tax rate).
Since a single quantity of pre-tax business-generated income allocable
to a given individual is always subject to the same (actual and effective) income tax rate under an integrated income tax regime, it follows that the double income tax regime with variable deferral is not
equivalent to an integrated income tax regime.
Theorem 5 has tremendous consequences. Since the mere possibility of deferral generally destroys the equivalence of an integrated
income tax regime and any double income tax regime, it is worthwhile to ask whether, even in a country satisfying all the predicates for
potential equivalence (that is, satisfying all of the predicates of Theorem 2), it is preferable to have an integrated income tax regime or
some nonequivalent double income tax regime that offers some variable amount of deferral. The question can be phrased more pointedly:
Should an ideal income tax regime permit (or even require) deferral
opportunities and, if so, why? An answer lies in the purpose of taxation. I have assumed throughout this Article that the sovereign imposes taxes to pay for various goods and services that provide benefits
to business and non-business activities. If so, the sovereign's most
straightforward approach to taxation is to impose taxes at the time it
provides the corresponding benefits. To the extent that business activities and "corresponding" non-business activities are conducted in
different tax periods, it follows that a "corporate" income tax and a
corresponding "individual" income tax should be imposed in different tax periods. In other words, deferral may be proper.
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Is it conceivable that business activities and "corresponding" nonbusiness activities can be conducted in different tax periods? What
might that even mean? Consider a business activity conducted in a
given tax period. Such business activity generates a certain amount of
pre-tax income during the tax period. Assuming that the business activity benefits from the sovereign's provision of goods and services as it
generates income, it is appropriate to subject the business activity's
pre-tax income to a corporate income tax during the tax period. If so,
then the business activity indirectly generates a certain amount of after-corporate-income-tax income during the tax period. This amount
of after-corporate-income-tax income should be subject to an individual income tax during such tax period if, and only if, it accurately
reflects the conduct of a commensurate amount of non-business activity during the tax period. I submit that it may, or it may not.
Consider a miserly hermit who lives in a hovel and eats cat food,
but who nonetheless generates a large (and growing) amount of aftercorporate-income-tax income. The hermit does not appear to benefit
terribly much in her individual non-business capacity from the sover-

eign's provision of a police force (she has no non-business assets to
protect), or roads (she has no friends to visit), or courts (she engages
in few consumption activities that could spawn litigation), or schools
(she has no friends to converse with), or a social safety net (she has no
non-business assets that could be lost in a revolution), or a national
defense (she has no non-business assets that could be lost in an invasion). The explanation for this divergence between an individual's
after-corporate-income-tax income and her level of non-business activity is, of course, that the former bears no necessary relationship to
consumption, while the latter is, by very definition, consumption. It
follows that the individual "income" tax component of an ideal
double income tax regime should be nothing other than a consumption tax! Thus, I have illustrated:
Theorem 6: An income tax regime that fairly takes into account all of
the business and non-business benefits derived by individuals
from the sovereign will implicitly or explicitly impose a "corporate" income tax on all business-generated income at the time
such income is generated, and will implicitly or explicitly impose
an "individual" income tax on all after-business-income-tax income at the time such income is consumed. Thus, so long as not
all after-business-income-tax income is consumed as soon as it is
generated, a fair income tax regime must be a double income tax
regime.
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The predicate in the last sentence of Theorem 6 is surely an accurate description of the "real" world. Thus, an appropriate income tax
burden in the real world can be imposed only by means of a double
income tax regime-and not by means of an integrated income tax
regime-even in the absence of international contacts (and/or in the
absence of peculiar individuals, such as King Midas or Sisyphus).
Before turning from the underpinnings of ideal double taxation
to its practical implementation, it is worth mentioning a practical consideration bolstering the argument that the individual income tax
component of an ideal double income tax regime must be a consumption tax, namely that with respect to outbound investors, the individual income tax component of any double income tax regime is likely
to effectively be a consumption tax, whether the sovereign wishes it to
be or not. The reason lies in the administrative difficulty attendant
with taxing any outbound investor. In general, a sovereign will be
able to obtain only very incomplete information as to the income underlying such investor's investment. Indeed, in many cases, the sovereign will be unable to determine, and therefore to tax, anything other
than the amount of after-foreign-tax income actually distributed to
the investor. 5 1 In such cases, so long as the investor can arrange to
receive her after-foreign-tax income only as and when she wishes to
consume such income, she will effectively be taxed only upon consumption. But if an outbound investor can achieve the deferral inherent in a consumption tax, there is no basis in fairness (or for that
matter in efficiency) for denying similar deferral opportunities to residents who invest locally. Accordingly, as already noted, the individual income tax component of a double income tax regime should be a
consumption tax.
III.

REAL-LIFE POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE U.S.

At this point, it is important to make clear that I have demonstrated only one claim, albeit a large one: I have demonstrated that, so
long as the world either is replete with international contacts, or is a
51 In some cases, the sovereign will have difficulty obtaining any information at
all. In other cases, it may be able to discover the foreign taxes paid by the foreign
business and the foreign income earned by the foreign business (as measured under
foreign law). In such cases, the sovereign must allocate this apples-to-oranges amount
of after-foreign-tax income to all the different stakeholders in the foreign business
under something akin to the current Code Section 704 partnership income allocation
rules. See I.R.C. § 704 (2000). It is unlikely that this could be done with even reasonable accuracy. In particular, the investor, in conjunction with the business, would have
every incentive to argue that her proper allocation is nothing more than the amounts
actually distributed.
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multi-period world in which not all after-business-income-tax income
is immediately consumed, it is necessary for a sovereign intent on fairness to impose a double income tax regime. Specifically, the sovereign must impose a corporate, or more correctly an entity, income tax
on all income generated by local business activity at the time such
income is produced, and then must impose an individual income tax
on all locally-consumed after-entity-income-tax income at the time
such income is consumed.
I have not said anything about how a sovereign should determine
the aggregate amount of tax to impose. Throughout, I have taken
that amount to be given. In fact, however, a sovereign would need a
way to determine this. Presumably, so long as the sovereign is benevolent, it would engage in an optimization exercise the upshot of which
would be that the last dollar or yen it spends on goods and services
would provide a dollar or a yen worth of aggregate benefits. Thus, for
example, if the benefits it provides were capable of being targeted
solely at business activity, the last dollar or yen of such benefits would
facilitate the generation of an incremental dollar or yen worth of income. And if the benefits it provides were capable of being targeted
solely at non-business activity, the last dollar or yen of such benefits
would produce the same amount of utility as would a dollar or yen
spent privately. That is, the sovereign would set marginal cost equal to
marginal benefit.
In addition, in Part II, I tabled the discussion of how a sovereign
should determine the fraction of the cost of the goods and services it
provides that should be collected by means of an "entity" income tax,
and the fraction that should be collected by means of an "individual"
income tax. Perhaps the greatest problem that will be encountered in
making this determination is that, as already noted, it is essentially
meaningless for a sovereign to divide the goods and services it provides into those that are provided for the benefit of business activity
and those that are provided for the benefit of non-business activity.
Rather, most goods and services are provided for the benefit of both.
What follows from this observation is that a sovereign's breakdown of its expenditures into those that are allocable to business activity and those that are allocable to non-business activity is necessarily
essentially arbitrary. 52 But it is not completely so. Thus, suppose the
sovereign could imagine exactly what the world would look like with52 See HARRius, supra note 32, at 479 (arguing that a country is essentially free to
make this choice as it sees fit: "The only one in a position to even approximate an
appropriate division of the composite income tax into source [i.e., corporate] and
residence [i.e., individual] portions is the country itself.")
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out any inbound investors. Clearly, in such world, there would be a
diminished amount of domestic business activity. Presumably, in such
world, the sovereign would provide fewer goods and services. The
cost of the foregone goods and services are clearly costs that should be
allocated to the business activity of the inbound investors. Thus, the
relationship between these costs and the income generated by inbound investors provides a lower bound as to the rate of tax that
should be imposed on such inbound investors' income, and hence on
entity income in general.
Similarly, suppose the sovereign could imagine exactly what the
world would look like without any outbound investors. That is, the
individuals who do not invest domestically, and all of their wealth and
income, simply disappear. Clearly, in such a world, there would be a
diminished amount of domestic consumption. And presumably, in
such world, the sovereign would provide fewer goods and services.
The cost of the foregone goods and services are clearly costs that
should be allocated to the non-business activity of the outbound investors. Thus, the relationship between these costs and the income generated by outbound investors provides a lower bound as to the "rate"
of tax that should be imposed on such outbound investors' income,
and hence on individual income in general.
My suspicion is that, after engaging in this exercise, the sovereign
will still have significant flexibility as to how to divide the aggregate
tax burden between entity income taxes and individual income taxes.
In particular, in the case of the United States, I suspect that one plausible division of the aggregate income tax burden would be the one
suggested by the current corporate income tax and the current individual income tax. For example, if foreigners did not, on average,
believe that they received benefits from the U.S. government in an
amount that fairly compensated them for the income taxes they pay,
they would presumably invest elsewhere. Since they do not, or in any
event since many of them do not, it follows that the current aggregate
corporate income tax burden cannot be unreasonable. Similarly, the
absence of wholesale emigration of U.S. residents to foreign lands is
strong evidence that the current aggregate individual income tax burden cannot be unreasonable either.
But these observations do not mean that either the aggregate
U.S. corporate income tax burden or the aggregate U.S. individual
income tax burden is imposed in a reasonable way. Focusing on the
corporate income tax burden first, I have already noted that a proper
"corporate" income tax must burden all business-generated income,
since all such income benefits from the package of goods and services
the U.S. provides to business activity. In particular, focusing on the
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purely domestic context, a proper corporate income tax must burden
all businesses, not just those conducted in corporate form, for even
businesses conducted as partnerships or limited liability companies
benefit from the U.S. government's package of goods and services.
Moreover, a proper corporate income tax must indirectly burden all
participants in all businesses, not merely equity owners, since all participants at least arguably benefit from the U.S. government's package
of goods and services. 53 That is, there is no reason to believe that a
business that decreases its profitability (as currently defined under
U.S. income tax principles) by increasing its leverage-issuing debt
and retiring equity-will derive less benefit from the goods and services provided by the U.S. government after such recapitalization than
it did before.
In the cross-border context, a proper corporate income tax must
fully burden all business income generated by nonresidents, while a
proper individual income tax must keep its fingers off such income.
Thus, active business income, that is, income effectively connected
with a trade or business, earned directly by nonresident individuals or
earned indirectly by nonresident individuals in their capacities as equity owners in flow-through entities, must be fully burdened by the
corporate income tax, but only by the corporate income tax. Under
current law, such income is not burdened by the corporate income
tax at all, but is fully burdened by the individual income tax. 54 Thus,
the current tax regime structure incorrectly implies that the affected
nonresident individuals do not benefit from the U.S. government's
provision of business benefits, but do benefit from the U.S.- government's provision of non-business benefits. This is exactly backwards
and should be corrected.
In addition, business income earned indirectly by nonresident individuals in their capacities as equity owners in corporations should be
fully burdened by the corporate income tax, but only by the corporate
income tax. Under current law, such income is indeed fully burdened
by the corporate income tax, but is then additionally burdened by a
withholding tax. 55 Thus, the current tax regime structure incorrectly
implies that the affected nonresident individuals not only fully benefit
from the U.S. government's provision of business benefits, but also to

53 Even if a participant only arguably benefits, it is still necessary for the corporate
income tax regime to indirectly burden her. See Schlunk, supra note 3, at 362-67.
54 I.R.C. § 871(b)(1) (2000).
55 See id. § 871 (a) (1) (A). This withholding tax rate is generally reduced, but not
eliminated, through tax treaties.
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some extent benefit from the U.S. government's provision of non-business benefits.

-6
5

This should be corrected.

Finally, business income earned indirectly by nonresident individuals in capacities other than as equity owners in businesses should be
fully burdened by the corporate income tax, but only by the corporate
income tax. To accomplish this, the double income tax regime must,
as already mentioned, deny any deduction for payments or accruals
made by a business to various stakeholders, irrespective of whether
such stakeholders are residents or nonresidents. In contrast, current
law generally permits payments or accruals denominated as interest,
rents and royalties, and wages to be fully deducted by a business, both
when made to residents and when made to nonresidents. 57 When the
already taxed income is then paid to a nonresident individual, a
proper double income tax regime would impose no additional tax. In
contrast, under current law, interest, rents and royalties paid to nonresident individuals are all generally subject to withholding tax. 58 And
wages paid to nonresident individuals are generally fully subject to the
individual income tax. Thus, the current tax regime structure arguably incorrectly implies that nonresident individuals earning interest,
rents and royalties, and wages do not benefit from the U.S. government's provision of business benefits, but rather to some extent benefit from the U.S. government's provision of non-business benefits. 59
This, again, is exactly backwards, and should be corrected.
56 Alternatively, the structure might reflect the sovereign's judgment that it is
more expensive to provide non-business benefits to nonresident shareholders than to
resident shareholders. But I can think of no reason why that might be true.
57 The Code does, under certain limited circumstances, provide different treatment when the recipient of an interest payment is a nonresident, rather than a resident. I.R.C. § 163(0).
58 The Code nominally imposes a 30% withholding tax on all such payments. See
id. § 871(a) (1) (A). In fairness, however, it should be noted that such tax rarely applies. See id. In the case of interest earned with respect to so-called portfolio debt, the
withholding tax is abated. See id. § 871 (h). In addition, the withholding tax on royalties is also generally reduced to 0% by tax treaty. See MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY art.
12.1 (1997).
59 Alternatively, the structure might reflect a belief that nonresidents earning interest, rents, and royalties demand and consume only business benefits, but in the
amounts reflected by their withholding tax payments, rather than in the amounts that
would have been determined had the corporate income tax applied. If the withholding tax rate were less than the prevailing U.S. individual income tax rate in some
systematic way, it might indeed be evidence of such belief. That is, since residents
also currently escape the corporate income tax on interest, rents, and royalties, it is
arguable that the individual income tax they pay on such items funds both the business benefits they demand and consume to produce such income, and any non-business benefits they demand and consume. (Of course, such bifurcation would throw
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Turning now to the individual income tax component of a
proper double income tax regime, such component should, for the
reasons explained in Part II.E, be a so-called consumption tax. Thus,
amounts of after-entity-income-tax income should be subject to this
tax when, and only when, they are consumed. In particular, neither
the character of the income (for example, wages, interest, dividends,
etc.), nor the actions of third persons with respect to the income (for
example, a corporate board's decision to pay a dividend rather than
to retain earnings), should affect its taxation.
In addition to adopting the timing features of a consumption tax,
the ideal double income tax regime would force the amendment of
another aspect of the United States' current individual income tax
regime. In particular, since the individual income tax should reflect
the non-business benefits provided to individuals, it would need to be
fully imposed on the after-foreign-income-tax income earned (or,
rather, consumed) by resident individuals. Under current law, resident individuals are generally allowed a foreign tax credit that reduces
the amount of individual income tax they must pay on their foreign
source income, to reflect the fact that such income has "already been
taxed" by the foreign country.6 0 It has, but that is largely beside the
point. That is, a resident individual will benefit from the U.S. government's provision of non-business benefits in an amount determined
by the amount of foreign source income she can repatriate and consume. Thus, it is inappropriate to allow her a foreign tax credit for
her foreign income tax payments. Of course, it would also be inappropriate to tax her on her gross foreign source income, since she
cannot in fact repatriate and consume amounts that have been diverted by a foreign sovereign. Thus, if for any reason her gross foreign source income is included in her individual income tax

into grave doubt the correctness of the current income tax treatment of corporate
equity.) The problem with this explanation, however, is that the withholding tax rate
imposed on nonresidents is not less than the individual income tax rate in any systematic way. Rather, the withholding tax rate varies from nonresident to nonresident
based on the terms of treaties or, in the absence of treaties, on the Code. This is
inconsistent with the notion that the withholding tax is funding nonresidents' business benefits. Moreover, in many cases, the ultimate withholding tax rate is 0%. This,
too, is inconsistent with the notion that the withholding tax is funding nonresidents'
business benefits.
60 See I.R.C. §§ 901-908.
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calculation (as it is under current law), 6 1 she should be entitled to a
62
deduction for any foreign income taxes paid.
Finally, to the extent that foreign source income is earned by a
U.S. business, rather than by a U.S. individual, the proper double income tax regime would exclude such income from the business' taxable income for purposes of computing the business' corporate income
tax. The reason, of course, is that such income will not, in general,
benefit from the U.S. government's provision of business benefits, but
rather only from the foreign sovereign's provision of business benefits. Thus, only as and when such foreign-source (necessarily afterforeign-tax) income makes its way (or is deemed to make its way) out
of the U.S. business and into the hands of a U.S. resident individual
(and is consumed by such individual) should the U.S. taxing authority
take a cut: at that point the individual income tax should be levied on
such income.
CONCLUSION

This Article has examined the proposition that double income
taxation is "unfair" and "doesn't make any sense" and has, in general,
found the proposition to be wanting. That is, although double income taxation as currently practiced in the United States is undoubtedly unfair and nonsensical, the problem lies not with the concept of

double income taxation, but rather with its current implementation.
In particular, so long as a sovereign provides or can be deemed to
provide benefits to individuals both in their business and in their nonbusiness capacities, as will always be the case in a world with international contacts, and as will generally be the case in a world without
international contacts but with multiple tax periods, it will be fair and
sensible for it to impose separate taxes that reflect the business and
the non-business benefits it provides.
More is true. So long as a country has either sufficient international contacts or a multi-period time horizon, any tax regime other
than a proper double income tax regime will necessarily be unfair and
nonsensical! Given that the modern world is characterized both by
significant and ever-increasing amounts of international contacts, and
by a multi-period time horizon, it follows that every country in the
world should enact a proper double income tax regime. In particular,
61 Id. § 862.
62 The Code allows such a deduction. Id. § 164(a)(3). In practice, however, taxpayers rarely avail themselves of this deduction due to the availability of the generally
more favorable foreign tax credit mechanism.
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the President, rather than dismanding the United States' very improper current double income tax regime, should devote his energies
to transforming such regime into a proper double income tax regime.

